ISBN:
9789401126106
Language:
English
Pages:
Online-Ressource (XXI, 324 p)
,
digital
Edition:
Springer eBook Collection. Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
Series Statement:
Philosophical Studies Series 52
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Keywords:
Philosophy (General)
;
Semantics
;
Artificial intelligence
;
Semiotics.
;
Philosophy.
Abstract:
1: Animal Cognition and Human Cognition: A Necessary Dialogue -- I. Introduction -- II. Characterization of Comparative Cognition -- III. Cognitive Modules and Evolution -- IV. Two Goals of Comparative Research: General Processes and Evolutionary Sequences -- V. Consciousness and Cognition -- VI. Conclusions -- 2: User Modelling in Knowledge-Based Systems -- I. Introduction -- II. Situations of Interactive Communications -- III. The Content of the User Model -- IV. Characteristic Dimensions of a User’s Model -- V. Domain-Knowledge: Shallow Versus Deep Modelling -- VI. Modelling Intentions -- VII. Building a User’s Model -- VIII. Learner’s Model -- IX. Conclusion -- 3: Changing Beliefs Rationally: Some Puzzles -- I. Background -- II. A Justification of Generalized Conditionalisation -- III. The Judy Benjamin Problem -- IV. An Apparent Counterexample to Simple Conditionalisation -- V. The Three Prisoners -- VI. Judy Benjamin Again: The Strong Strategy -- VII. Independence -- 4: On the Representation of Linguistic Information -- I. Introduction -- II. The Modularity Hypothesis -- III. Grammar, Pragmatics and Modularity -- IV. Interdisciplinarity in the Analysis of Linguistic Information -- V. Disjunct Adverbials Pragmatically Oriented Towards the Speaker or Hearer -- VI. On The Representation of Disjunct Constituents: A Multidimentional Approach -- VII. Conclusions -- 5: Modelling Memory for Models -- I. Introduction -- II. Two Senses of “Model” -- III. Models in Working Memory -- IV. Representations for Syllogistic Reasoning -- V. Distributed Bindings and Syllogistic Reasoning -- 6: On The Study of Linguistic Performance -- I. A Proposal for “Cognitive Science” and A Specification of it -- II. Current Situation in Linguistic Performance Theory -- III. Some Issues Regarding Research Programs on Linguistic Performance -- IV. Appendix -- 7: Partiality and Coherence in Concept Combination -- I. Introduction -- II. Flexibility and Specificity -- III. Sense Selection -- IV. Sense Generation -- V. Partiality, Coherence and Concept Combination -- VI. Conclusions -- 8: The Labyrinth of Attitude Reports -- I. Mental States -- II. Semantic Contents -- III. Attitude Reports as Explanations -- IV. The Crimmins-Perry Theory -- V. Reports and Reporting -- VI. Two Kinds of Attitude Reports -- VII. Reporting and Explaining -- 9: Aunty’s Own Argument for the Language of Thought -- I. Introduction: Aunty and the Language of Thought -- II. The Threat of Regress -- III. First Stage: Systematic Cognitive Processes -- IV. First Stage: From System to Syntax -- V. Second Stage: The Structure of Thought -- VI. Second Stage: Concepts and Inference -- VII. Two Objections to the Second Stage -- VIII. Conceptualised Thought and the Connectionist Programme -- IX. An Invitation to Eliminativism? -- 10: Cognitive Science And Semantic Representations -- I. Cognitive and Other Sciences as Using Representations -- II. Natural and Rational Representations -- III. Sources of Variability in Representations -- IV. Use of Prescriptive Rules -- V. Description of Natural Representations -- VI. Token Representations, Long Term Memory Representations, and the Notion of Activation -- VII. Cross-Compatibility with Neurobiology and Artificial Intelligence -- VIII. Conclusion -- 11: Anchoring Conceptual Content: Scenarios And Perception -- I. Scenarios Introduced -- II. Scenarios: Consequences and Comparisons -- III. A Further Level of Content: An Application -- IV. Spatial Reasoning and Action.
Abstract:
THE PLACE OF PHILOSOPHY IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE During the last few years, many books have been published and many meetings have been held on Cognitive Science. A cursory review of their contents shows such a diversity of topics and approaches that one might well infer that there are no genuine criteria for classifying a paper or a lecture as a contribution to Cognitive Science. It is as though the only criterion is to have appeared in a book or in the programme of a meeting or title we can find the expression " . . . Cognitive Science" in whose name or something like that. Perhaps this situation is due to the (relative) youth of the field, which is seeking its own identity, still involved in a process of formation and consolidation within the scientific community; but there are actually deep disagreements about how a science of the mind should be worked out, including how to understand its own subject, that is, "the mind. "While for some the term makes reference to a set of phenomena impossible to grasp by any scientific approach, for others "the mind" would be a sort of myth, and the mental terms await elimination by other more handy and empirically tractable terms.
DOI:
10.1007/978-94-011-2610-6
URL:
Volltext
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