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  • Cambridge : Cambridge University Press  (2)
  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press | Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press
    ISBN: 9780511617430
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xii, 591 pages)
    Edition: Second edition.
    DDC: 302/.13
    RVK:
    Keywords: Motivation ; Informationsökonomie ; Mathematisches Modell ; Wirtschaftliches Verhalten ; Anreiz ; Asymmetrische Information ; Kollektiventscheidung ; Public-Choice-Theorie
    Abstract: This book, first published in 2006, examines the incentives at work in a wide range of institutions to see how and how well coordination is achieved by informing and motivating individual decision makers. The book examines the performance of agents hired to carry out specific tasks, from taxi drivers to CEOs. It investigates the performance of institutions, from voting schemes to kidney transplants, to see if they enhance general well being. The book examines a broad range of market transactions, from auctions to labor markets, to the entire economy. The analysis is conducted using specific worked examples, lucid general theory, and illustrations drawn from news stories. Of the seventy different topics and sections, only twelve require a knowledge of calculus. The second edition offers new chapters on auctions, matching and assignment problems, and corporate governance. Boxed examples are used to highlight points of theory and are separated from the main text.
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press | Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press
    ISBN: 9781139547390
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xii, 685 pages)
    Edition: Third edition.
    DDC: 302/.13
    RVK:
    Abstract: When incentives work well, individuals prosper. When incentives are poor, the pursuit of self-interest is self-defeating. This book is wholly devoted to the topical subject of incentives from individual, collective, and institutional standpoints. This third edition is fully updated and expanded, including a new section on the 2007-08 financial crisis and a new chapter on networks as well as specific applications of school placement for students, search engine ad auctions, pollution permits, and more. Using worked examples and lucid general theory in its analysis, and seasoned with references to current and past events, Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information examines: the performance of agents hired to carry out specific tasks, from taxi drivers to CEOs; the performance of institutions, from voting schemes to medical panels deciding who gets kidney transplants; a wide range of market transactions, from auctions to labor markets to the entire economy. Suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students studying incentives as part of courses in microeconomics, economic theory, managerial economics, political economy, and related areas of social science.
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 25 Sep 2018)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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