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  • 1
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 20 Seiten) , Illustrationen
    Series Statement: OECD economic policy paper no. 17 (September 2016)
    Series Statement: OECD Economic Policy Papers no.17
    Keywords: Finanzausgleich ; Räumliche Verteilung ; Wirtschaftliche Konvergenz ; OECD-Staaten ; Economics ; Arbeitspapier ; Graue Literatur
    Abstract: Across the OECD, GDP per capita is converging. In contrast, regional disparities – or differences in GDP per capita across jurisdictions – are rising, mainly as a result of widening productivity differences. Fiscal decentralisation could help reduce them again. According to new OECD research, assigning more ownsource revenue to sub-national governments dampens regional GDP disparities and underpins regional convergence. In more decentralised settings, catching-up regions appear to adopt policy innovations more rapidly and their policy innovations have a stronger impact. Conversely, intergovernmental grants tend to fuel disparities, probably because they discourage lagging regions to develop their economic and fiscal base. However, when replacing intergovernmental transfers by own-source revenue, lower disparities in regional output may come at the cost of larger disparities in regional income and more unequal public service standards. Reforms to intergovernmental fiscal frameworks should therefore be two-pronged: a rise in sub-national own-source revenue should be paired with a re-design of intergovernmental transfers and fiscal equalisation, in order to make all jurisdictions enjoy the benefits of more sub-central fiscal power.
    Note: Zusammenfassung in französischer Sprache
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  • 2
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten) , Illustrationen
    Series Statement: OECD Economics Department working papers no. 1330
    Keywords: 1995-2011 ; Finanzbeziehungen ; Räumliche Verteilung ; OECD-Staaten ; Urban, Rural and Regional Development ; Economics ; Amtsdruckschrift ; Arbeitspapier ; Graue Literatur
    Abstract: Fiscal decentralisation can lead to a more efficient provision of local public goods and services and promote a better match between policies and citizens’ preferences. At the same time, however, there are concerns about whether all regions will gain from more autonomy. Decentralisation may not lift all boats, with “poor” regions losing competitiveness with respect to better endowed ones, thus increasing regional disparities. The present work investigates the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and regional inequality within countries. Particular attention is paid to the different channels through which decentralisation can affect disparities: taxing powers, spending autonomy and the vertical fiscal imbalance. The empirical analysis, which is conducted on a sample of 30 OECD countries for the period 1995-2011, suggests that a balanced fiscal structure, where local spending is mainly financed by local taxation, reduces regional disparities, by providing an incentive to better use local resources and implement policies that favour economic development.
    Note: Zusammenfassung in französischer Sprache
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  • 3
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten) , Illustrationen
    Series Statement: OECD Economics Department working papers no. 1331
    Keywords: 1996-2011 ; Finanzbeziehungen ; Einkommensverteilung ; Gini-Koeffizient ; OECD-Staaten ; Economics ; Amtsdruckschrift ; Arbeitspapier ; Graue Literatur
    Abstract: This paper investigates the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economy-wide disposable income inequality. Drawing on a dataset of up to 20 OECD countries over a period from 1996 to 2011, a regression analysis is performed, relating several indicators of national income inequality and a wide array of fiscal decentralisation indicators. The results indicate a weak, inequality-reducing relationship between decentralisation and income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, but the effect is rather small and unstable across specifications. Fine-graining the analysis by using income percentile ratios, in turn, produces more significant and stable results. It shows that the effects of fiscal decentralisation are not the same along the income distribution. While decentralisation tends to be associated with a reduction in income inequality between high incomes and the median, it is linked to a divergence of low income groups from the median, notably via sub-central tax autonomy. Transfers between levels of government also tend to increase the gap between lower and middle incomes. Interpreting these effects jointly, it seems that mainly middle income earners benefit from fiscal decentralisation. Finally, some insights on decentralisation and regional income inequality are presented. At first sight, fiscal decentralisation does not seem to be associated with income sorting in large jurisdictions, but a more fine-grained analysis is required to answer this question.
    Note: Zusammenfassung in französischer Sprache
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  • 4
    Language: English
    Pages: 40 p. , 21 x 29.7cm
    Series Statement: OECD Economics Department Working Papers no.706
    Keywords: Economics
    Abstract: This paper analyses trends in and driving forces of the revenue composition of sub-central governments (SCG). Between 1995 and 2005 the share of SCG in total government spending increased from 31 to 33%, while the SCG tax share remained stable at around 17%, increasing SCG’s dependence on intergovernmental grants. While equal access to public services is the most common justification for such grants, the grant systems of most countries are much larger than required by equalization. Moreover, rather than smoothing out SCG revenue fluctuations over the cycle, grants often tend to exacerbate them. Finally, there is some evidence that grants reduce SCG tax raising effort, inflate SCG spending and increase SCG deficits and debt. The economic crisis will both sharply reduce SCG’s own tax revenues and – via budget constraints at the central level – increase pressure on the grant system. The crisis could hence help rethink the SCG revenue mix, their tax structure and the size and design of intergovernmental transfers.
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  • 5
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (13 p.) , 21 x 29.7cm.
    Series Statement: OECD Working Papers on Fiscal Federalism no.10
    Keywords: Taxation
    Abstract: Tax sharing and intergovernmental grants are two sub-central funding arrangements that are often difficult to disentangle. The dividing line is not drawn uniformly across OECD countries or across time, and rules established in National Accounts, Revenue Statistics and others give incomplete guidance. Moreover, tax sharing arrangements may differ according to how tax revenue is distributed across individual jurisdictions. In order to ensure that fiscal arrangements are recorded properly and on a comparable basis, a set of clear criteria to delineate them is required. This section presents the results of a test that was applied in order to find the dividing line a) between tax sharing and intergovernmental grants and b) between different categories of tax sharing. The test was performed using questionnaire responses and builds on earlier documents on the same topic presented to Fiscal Network Delegates in 2006 and 2008.
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  • 6
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (38 p.) , 21 x 29.7cm.
    Series Statement: OECD Working Papers on Fiscal Federalism no.7
    Keywords: Taxation
    Abstract: This paper analyses trends and driving forces in the revenue composition of sub-central government (SCG). Between 1995 and 2005 the share of SCG in total government spending increased significantly from 31 to 33 percent while the SCG tax share remained stable at around 17 percent, increasing SCG’s dependence on intergovernmental grants. While equal access to public services is the most common justification for such grants, the grant systems of most countries are much larger than required by equalization. Moreover, rather than smoothing out SCG revenue fluctuations over the cycle, grants often tend to exacerbate them. Finally, there is some evidence that grants reduce SCG tax effort, inflate SCG spending and increase SCG deficits and debt. Efficiency and accountability would call for a higher share of SCG spending covered by own taxes. However, that is not easy: increasing property taxes – the most suitable tax for SCG – usually meets with strong resistance. Tax sharing arrangements where central government cedes a part of its income or consumption tax revenue could help lift the SCG tax share without increasing the total tax burden.
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