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  • 1
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (37 p)
    Edition: 2010 World Bank eLibrary
    Parallel Title: Khemani, Stuti Political Capture of Decentralization
    Abstract: A recent trend in decentralization in several large and diverse countries is the creation of local jurisdictions below the regional level - municipalities, towns, and villages - whose spending is almost exclusively financed by grants from both regional and national governments. This paper argues that such grants-financed decentralization enables politicians to target benefits to pivotal voters and organized interest groups in exchange for political support. Decentralization, in this model, is subject to political capture, facilitating vote-buying, patronage, or pork-barrel projects, at the expense of effective provision of broad public goods. There is anecdotal evidence on local politics in several large countries that is consistent with this theory. The paper explores its implications for international development programs in support of decentralization
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (42 p)
    Edition: 2010 World Bank eLibrary
    Parallel Title: Khemani, Stuti Political economy of infrastructure spending in India
    Abstract: This paper examines a puzzle in the political economy of infrastructure in India - the co-existence of relatively low shares of capital spending in public budgets alongside evidence of large demand for village infrastructure from poor voters. It argues that this pattern is due to infrastructure projects being used at the margin for political rent-seeking, while spending on employment and welfare transfers are the preferred vehicles to win votes for re-election. New suggestive evidence on the variation of public spending composition across states, and within states over time is offered that is consistent with this argument. This evidence underscores a growing argument in the development literature that the level and composition of public spending per se may not be sufficient metrics to assess the quality of public goods policies - greater infrastructure spending in some contexts may go to political rents rather than to the actual delivery of broad public goods for growth and poverty reduction
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  • 3
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (56 p)
    Series Statement: World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Khemani, Stuti Demand and Supply Curves in Political Markets: Understanding the Problem of Public Goods and Why Governments Fail Them
    Abstract: This paper brings the economic tools of demand and supply curves to better understand how political markets shape the selection of government policies. It does so to tackle a problem at the intersection of political science and economics: government failure to pursue policies on the basis of sound technical evidence. Too often, the leaders who wield policy-making power within governments deliberately and knowingly ignore sound technical advice, or are unable to pursue it despite the best of intentions, because of political constraints. The paper shows how the prevailing dominant explanation for suboptimal policies and weak institutions, of special interest and elite capture, can be understood as the selection of a point on the political demand curve by oligopolistic political competition. Further, it shows how elite capture is only one of many possible outcomes, and is endogenous to preferences and beliefs in society. Preferences in society for public goods (or the lack thereof), and beliefs about how others are behaving in the public sector, are the primitive or fundamental elements driving the shapes of political demand and supply curves and thence the selection of public policies and institutions. This framework highlights the need for future research to understand where political preferences and beliefs come from, which is essential to the design of institutions that address problems of public goods
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  • 4
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: World Bank E-Library Archive
    Series Statement: Policy Notes
    Abstract: Legitimacy in the time of COVID-19 can be understood as the ability of leaders to win compliance with new public health orders because people share a widespread belief that everyone is complying. This perspective, building on the logic of game theory, which can help explain strategic interactions among large numbers of people in a society or polity, yields a powerful insight: that governments in developing countries, as the first line of defense against a life-threatening disease, have received a windfall of legitimacy. On the one hand, this legitimacy windfall can be wasted, or worse, used to intensify divisive politics, grab power, and install government at the commanding heights of the economy and society, even after the pandemic recedes. On the other hand, for reform leaders and international development partners that are motivated to improve governance for economic development, the crisis presents opportunities to build trust in public institutions. In this task, international organizations have a comparative advantage precisely because they are not part of domestic political games. But this dynamic may require changing how donors typically approach corruption in developing countries (in the context of financial assistance to countries with institutional weaknesses that predate the crisis); it may also necessitate change in how reform leaders in countries use the advantage of external partners to exert pressure for reform. The availability and strategic communication of credible, nonideological, and nonpartisan knowledge could enable societies to change a vicious cycle of high levels of corruption/low levels of trust to a virtuous one of high levels of trust and low levels of corruption
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  • 5
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (38 p)
    Edition: 2013 World Bank eLibrary
    Parallel Title: Khemani, Stuti Buying Votes vs. Supplying Public Services
    Abstract: This paper uses unique survey data to provide, for the first time in the literature, direct evidence that vote buying in poor economies is associated with lower provision of public services that disproportionately benefit the poor. Various features of the data and the institutional context allow the interpretation of this correlation as the equilibrium policy consequence of clientelist politics, ruling out alternate explanations (such as, for example, poverty driving both vote buying and health outcomes). The data come from the Philippines, a country context that allows for measuring vote buying during elections and services delivered by the administrative unit controlled by winners of those elections. The data reveal a significant, robust negative correlation between vote buying and the delivery of primary health services. In places where households report more vote buying, government records show that municipalities invest less in basic health services for mothers and children; and, quite strikingly, as a summary measure of weak service delivery performance, a higher percentage of children are severely under-weight
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  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (23 p)
    Series Statement: World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Khemani, Stuti Political Economy of Reform
    Abstract: This paper reviews the literature relevant to understanding political constraints to economic reforms. Reform refers to changes in government policies or institutional rules because status quo policies and institutions are not working well to achieve the goals of economic well-being and development. Further, reforms refer to the alternative policies and institutions that are available that would most likely perform better than the status quo. The main question examined in the political economy of reform literature has been why reforms are not undertaken when they are needed for the good of society. The succinct answer from the first generation of research is that conflict of interest between organized socio-political groups is responsible for some groups being able to stall reforms so that they can extract greater private rents from status quo policies. The next generation of research is tackling a more fundamental question: why does conflict of interest persist; or, why do some interest groups exert influence against reforms if there are indeed large gains to be had for society? These are questions about norms and preferences in society for public goods. The next step is to examine where norms and preferences for public goods come from, and which institutional arrangements are more conducive to solve the public goods problem of pursuing reforms. After reviewing the available and future directions for research, the paper concludes with what all of this means for policy makers who are interested in understanding the factors behind successful reforms
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  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : World Bank
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive Also available in print
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 3016
    Parallel Title: Khemani, Stuti Partisan politics and intergovernmental transfers in India
    Keywords: Intergovernmental fiscal relations ; Revenue sharing ; Intergovernmental fiscal relations ; Revenue sharing
    Note: "April 4, 2003 , Includes bibliographical references , Title from title screen as viewed on April 9, 2003 , Also available in print.
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  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : World Bank, Public Services, Development Research Group
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive Also available in print
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 2915
    Parallel Title: Khemani, Stuti Federal politics and budget deficits
    Keywords: Budget deficits ; Budget deficits
    Note: "October 17, 2002 , Includes bibliographical references , Title from title screen as viewed on October 28, 2002 , Also available in print.
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  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : World Bank
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive Also available in print
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 3164
    Parallel Title: Keefer, Philip Democracy, public expenditures, and the poor
    Keywords: Democracy ; Expenditures, Public ; Poor ; Democracy ; Expenditures, Public ; Poor
    Note: "November 6, 2003 , Includes bibliographical references , Title from title screen as viewed on November 6, 2003 , Also available in print.
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  • 10
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (226 pages)
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Abstract: Despite massive infrastructure investments, countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region continue to face unprecedented water scarcity due to climate change, population growth, and socioeconomic development. Current policy regimes for managing water across competing needs are primarily determined by state control of large infrastructure. Policy makers across the region understand the unsustainability of water allocations and that increasing investments in new infrastructure and technologies to increase water supply place a growing financial burden on governments. However, standard solutions for demand management--reallocating water to higher value uses, reducing waste, and increasing tariffs--pose difficult political dilemmas that, more often than not, are left unresolved. Without institutional reform, the region will likely remain in water distress even with increased financing for water sector infrastructure. 'The Economics of Water Scarcity in the Middle East and North Africa: Institutional Solutions' confronts the persistence and severity of water scarcity in MENA. The report draws on the tools of public economics to address two crucial challenges facing states in MENA: lack of legitimacy and trust. Evidence from the World Values Survey shows that people in the region believe that a key role of government is to keep prices down and that governments are reluctant to raise tariffs because of the risk of widespread protests. Instead of avoiding the 'politically sensitive' issue of water scarcity, this report argues that reform leaders and their external partners can reform national water institutions and draw on local political contestation to establish a new social contract. The crisis and emotive power of water in the region can be used to bolster legitimacy and trust and build a sustainable, inclusive, thriving economy that is resilient to climate change
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