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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    How Does Corporate Governance Affect Bank Capitalization Strategies? (2013)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (49 p)
    Edition: 2013 World Bank eLibrary
    Parallel Title: Anginer, Deniz How Does Corporate Governance Affect Bank Capitalization Strategies?
    Abstract: This paper examines how corporate governance and executive compensation affected bank capitalization strategies for an international sample of banks in 2003-2011. "Good" corporate governance, which favors shareholder interests, is found to give rise to lower bank capitalization. Boards of intermediate size, separation of the chief executive officer and chairman roles, and an absence of anti-takeover provisions, in particular, lead to low bank capitalization. However, executive options and stock wealth invested in the bank are associated with better capitalization except just before the crisis in 2006. In that year, stock options wealth was associated with lower capitalization, which suggests that potential gains from taking on more bank risk outweighed the prospect of additional loss. Banks' tendencies to continue payouts to shareholders after experiencing negative income shocks are shown to reflect executive risk-taking incentives
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-6636
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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    MPI Ethno. Forsch.
  • 2
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    Online Resource
    How Does Deposit Insurance Affect Bank Risk? : Evidence from the Recent Crisis (2012)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (29 p)
    Edition: 2012 World Bank eLibrary
    Parallel Title: Anginer, Deniz How Does Deposit Insurance Affect Bank Risk?
    Abstract: Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks, which leads to excessive risk-taking. This paper examines the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading to and during the recent financial crisis. It finds that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. The findings suggest that the "moral hazard effect" of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the "stabilization effect" of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. Nevertheless, the overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared with the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, the analysis finds that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended consequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-6289
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 3
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    Online Resource
    The Chrysler effect : the impact of the Chrysler bailout on borrowing costs (2010)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (48 p)
    Edition: 2010 World Bank eLibrary
    Parallel Title: Anginer, Deniz The Chrysler effect
    Abstract: Did the U.S. government's intervention in the Chrysler reorganization overturn bankruptcy law? Critics argue that the government-sponsored reorganization impermissibly elevated claims of the auto union over those of Chrysler's other creditors. If the critics are correct, businesses might suffer an increase in their cost of debt because creditors will perceive a new risk, that organized labor might leap-frog them in bankruptcy. This paper examines the financial market where this effect would be most detectible, the market for bonds of highly unionized companies. The authors find no evidence of a negative reaction to the Chrysler bailout by bondholders of unionized firms. They thus reject the notion that investors perceived a distortion of bankruptcy priorities. To the contrary, bondholders of unionized firms reacted positively to the Chrysler bailout. This evidence suggests that bondholders interpreted the Chrysler bailout as a signal that the government will stand behind unionized firms. The results are consistent with the notion that too-big-to-fail government policies generate moral hazard in the credit markets
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-5462
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Do Individual Investors Ignore Transaction Costs? (2017)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (57 p)
    Series Statement: World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als Anginer, Deniz Do Individual Investors Ignore Transaction Costs?
    Abstract: Using close to 800,000 (2,000,000) transactions by 66,000 (303,000) households in the United States (in Finland), this paper shows that individual investors with longer holding periods choose to hold less liquid stocks in their portfolios, consistent with Amihud and Mendelson's (1986) theory of liquidity clienteles. The relationship between holding periods and transaction costs is stronger among more financially sophisticated households. Households whose holding periods are positively related to transaction costs also earn higher gross returns on their investments before accounting for transaction costs, suggesting that attention to non-salient transaction costs is an indication of investing ability. The main findings are confirmed by analyzing changes in investors' holding periods around exogenous shocks to stock liquidity
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-8098
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 5
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    Online Resource
    Foreign Bank Subsidiaries' Default Risk During the Global Crisis : What Factors Help Insulate Affiliates from Their Parents? (2014)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (45 p)
    Edition: 2014 World Bank eLibrary
    Parallel Title: Anginer, Deniz Foreign Bank Subsidiaries' Default Risk During the Global Crisis
    Keywords: Bankenkrise ; Portfolio-Management ; Bank ; Ausländische Tochtergesellschaft ; Black-Scholes-Modell ; Kreditrisiko
    Abstract: This paper examines the association between the default risk of foreign bank subsidiaries and their parents during the global financial crisis, with the purpose of understanding what factors can help insulate affiliates from their parents. The paper finds evidence of a significant positive correlation between parent banks' and foreign subsidiaries' default risk. This correlation is lower for subsidiaries that have higher capital, retail deposit funding, and profitability ratios and that are more independently managed from their parents. Host country regulations also influence the extent to which shocks to the parents affect the subsidiaries' default risk. In particular, the correlation between the default risk of the subsidiary and the parent is lower for subsidiaries operating in countries that impose higher capital, reserve, provisioning, and disclosure requirements and tougher restrictions on bank activities
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Corporate Governance and Bank Insolvency Risk : International Evidence (2014)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (53 p)
    Edition: 2014 World Bank eLibrary
    Parallel Title: Anginer, Deniz Corporate Governance and Bank Insolvency Risk
    Abstract: This paper finds that shareholder-friendly corporate governance is positively associated with bank insolvency risk, as proxied by the Z-score and the Merton's distance to default measure, for an international sample of banks over the 2004-08 period. Banks are special in that "good" corporate governance increases bank insolvency risk relatively more for banks that are large and located in countries with sound public finances, as banks aim to exploit the financial safety net. Good corporate governance is specifically associated with higher asset volatility, more nonperforming loans, and a lower tangible capital ratio. Furthermore, good corporate governance is associated with more bank risk-taking at times of rapid economic expansion. Consistent with increased risk-taking, good corporate governance is associated with a higher valuation of the implicit insurance provided by the financial safety net, especially in the case of large banks. These results underline the importance of the financial safety net and too-big-to-fail policies in encouraging excessive risk-taking by banks
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-7017
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 7
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    Online Resource
    Bank Capital and Systemic Stability (2014)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (42 p)
    Edition: 2014 World Bank eLibrary
    Parallel Title: Anginer, Deniz Bank Capital and Systemic Stability
    Abstract: This paper distinguishes among various types of capital and examines their effect on system-wide fragility. The analysis finds that higher quality forms of capital reduce the systemic risk contribution of banks, whereas lower quality forms can have a destabilizing impact, particularly during crisis periods. The impact of capital on systemic risk is less pronounced for smaller banks, for banks located in countries with more generous safety nets, and in countries with institutions that allow for better public and private monitoring of financial institutions. The results show that regulatory capital is effective in reducing systemic risk and that regulatory risk weights are correlated with higher future asset volatility, but this relationship is significantly weaker for larger banks. The paper also finds that increased regulatory risk-weights not correlated with future asset volatility increase systemic fragility. Overall, the results are consistent with the theoretical literature that emphasizes capital as a potential buffer in absorbing liquidity, information, and economic shocks reducing contagious defaults
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-6948
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 8
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    Online Resource
    Has the Global Banking System Become More Fragile over Time? (2011)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (38 p)
    Edition: 2011 World Bank eLibrary
    Parallel Title: Anginer, Deniz Has the Global Banking System Become More Fragile over Time?
    Abstract: This paper examines time-series and cross-country variations in default risk co-dependence in the global banking system. The authors construct a default risk measure for all publicly traded banks using the Merton contingent claim model, and examine the evolution of the correlation structure of default risk for more than 1,800 banks in more than 60 countries. They find that there has been a significant increase in default risk co-dependence over the three-year period leading to the financial crisis. They also find that countries that are more integrated, and that have liberalized financial systems and weak banking supervision, have higher co-dependence in their banking sector. The results support an increase in scope for intra-national supervisory co-operation, as well as capital charges for "too-connected-to-fail" institutions that can impose significant externalities
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-5849
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Risk Absorption by the State : When is It Good Public Policy? (2011)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (31 p)
    Edition: 2011 World Bank eLibrary
    Parallel Title: Anginer, Deniz Risk Absorption by the State
    Abstract: The global financial crisis brought public guarantees to the forefront of the policy debate. Based on a review of the theoretical foundations of public guarantees, this paper concludes that the commonly used justifications for public guarantees based solely on agency frictions (such as adverse selection or lack of collateral) and/or un-internalized externalities are flawed. When risk is idiosyncratic, it is highly unlikely that a case for guarantees can be made without risk aversion. When risk aversion is explicitly added to the picture, public guarantees may be justified by the state's natural advantage in dealing with collective action failures (providing public goods). The state can spread risk more finely across space and time because it can coordinate and pool atomistic agents that would otherwise not organize themselves to solve monitoring or commitment problems. Public guarantees may be transitory, until financial systems mature, or permanent, when risk is fat-tailed. In the case of aggregate (non-diversifiable) risk, permanent public guarantees may also be justified, but in this case the state adds value not by spreading risk but by coordinating agents. In addition to greater transparency in justifying public guarantees, the analysis calls for exploiting the natural complementarities between the state and the markets in bearing risk
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-5893
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 10
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    Online Resource
    How Does Bank Competition Affect Systemic Stability? (2012)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (53 p)
    Edition: 2012 World Bank eLibrary
    Parallel Title: Anginer, Deniz How Does Bank Competition Affect Systemic Stability?
    Abstract: Using bank level measures of competition and co-dependence, the authors show a robust positive relationship between bank competition and systemic stability. Whereas much of the extant literature has focused on the relationship between competition and the absolute level of risk of individual banks, they examine the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks, hence systemic risk. They find that greater competition encourages banks to take on more diversified risks, making the banking system less fragile to shocks. Examining the impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on systemic stability shows that banking systems are more fragile in countries with weak supervision and private monitoring, with generous deposit insurance and greater government ownership of banks, and public policies that restrict competition. Furthermore, lack of competition has a greater adverse effect on systemic stability in countries with low levels of foreign ownership, weak investor protections, generous safety nets, and where the authorities provide limited guidance for bank asset diversification
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-5981
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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