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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Decentralization and Fiscal Management in Colombia (1999)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (49 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Webb, B. Steven Decentralization and Fiscal Management in Colombia
    Keywords: Bank ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Budget ; Debt ; Debt Markets ; Decentralization ; Decentralization Process ; Deconcentration ; Deficits ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Fiscal Decentralization ; Fiscal Deficits ; Interest ; Intergovernmental Relations ; Laws ; Local Governments ; Macroeconomic Stability ; Municipal Financial Management ; Municipalities ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Public and Municipal Finance ; Revenue ; Risk ; Subnational Governments ; Transfers ; Urban Development ; Urban Economics ; Value ; Bank ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Budget ; Debt ; Debt Markets ; Decentralization ; Decentralization Process ; Deconcentration ; Deficits ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Fiscal Decentralization ; Fiscal Deficits ; Interest ; Intergovernmental Relations ; Laws ; Local Governments ; Macroeconomic Stability ; Municipal Financial Management ; Municipalities ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Public and Municipal Finance ; Revenue ; Risk ; Subnational Governments ; Transfers ; Urban Development ; Urban Economics ; Value
    Abstract: May 1999 - Institutional arrangements have helped Colombia manage the fiscal aspects of decentralization, despite the country's political problems. Colombia's political geography contrasts sharply with its economy. Physical characteristics and guerilla war fragment the country geographically, yet it has a long tradition of political centrism and macroeconomic stability. Recently, with political and economic decentralization, there has been some weakening of macroeconomic performance. Dillinger and Webb explore institutional arrangements that have helped Colombia manage the fiscal aspects of decentralization, despite the country's political problems. Fiscal decentralization proceeded rapidly in Colombia. Education, health, and much infrastructure provision have been decentralized to the departmentos and municipios. Decentralization has led to substantial but not overwhelming problems, both in maintaining fiscal balance nationally (as resources are transferred to subnational levels) and in preventing unsustainable deficits by the subnational governments. The problems have arisen because central government interference prevents departments from controlling their costs and because of expectations of debt bailouts. Both are legacies of the earlier pattern of management from the center, and some recent changes-especially about subnational debt-may improve matters. Colombia's traditional political process has had difficulty dealing with problems of decentralization because traditional parties are weak in internal organization and have lost de facto rule over substantial territories. The fiscal problems of subnational government have been contained, however, because subnational governments are relatively weak politically and the central government, for the time being, has been able to enforce restrictions on subnational borrowing. This paper-a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Latin America and Caribbean Region-is part of a larger effort in the region to examine the macroeconomic consequences of decentralization. The authors may be contacted at wdillingerworldbank.org or swebb@worldbank.org
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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    MPI Ethno. Forsch.
  • 2
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    Online Resource
    Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies : Argentina and Brazil (1999)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (43 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Webb, B. Steven Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies
    Keywords: Bailouts ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Creditors ; Debt Markets ; Deficits ; Developing Countries ; Domestic Debt ; Emerging Markets ; External Debts ; Finance ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Fiscal Decentralization ; Fiscal Deficits ; Inflation ; Interest ; Levy ; Macroeconomic Stabilization ; Monetary Fund ; Municipal Financial Management ; Private Sector Development ; Public Finances ; Public Sector Deficits ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Public Spending ; Public and Municipal Finance ; Return ; Revenue ; Tax ; Urban Development ; Urban Economics ; Bailouts ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Creditors ; Debt Markets ; Deficits ; Developing Countries ; Domestic Debt ; Emerging Markets ; External Debts ; Finance ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Fiscal Decentralization ; Fiscal Deficits ; Inflation ; Interest ; Levy ; Macroeconomic Stabilization ; Monetary Fund ; Municipal Financial Management ; Private Sector Development ; Public Finances ; Public Sector Deficits ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Public Spending ; Public and Municipal Finance ; Return ; Revenue ; Tax ; Urban Development ; Urban Economics
    Abstract: May 1999 - Argentina and Brazil-two of the most decentralized public sectors in Latin America and (along with Colombia and India) among the most decentralized democracies in the developing world-faced similar problems in the 1980s: excessive public deficits and high inflation exacerbated by subnational deficits. In the 1990s, Argentina was more successful at macroeconomic stabilization, partly because it imposed harder budget constraints on the public sector nationally and partly because it had stronger party control of both national legislators and subnational governments. In shifting to decentralized public finances, a country's central government faces certain fiscal management problems. First, during and soon after the transition, unless it reduces spending or increases its own tax resources, the central government tends to have higher deficits as it shifts fiscal resources to subnational governments through transfers, revenue sharing, or delegation of tax bases. Reducing spending is hard not only because cuts are always hard but because subnational governments might not take on expected tasks, leaving the central government with a legal or political obligation to continue spending for certain services. Second, after decentralization, the local or state government faces popular pressure to spend more and tax less, creating the tendency to run deficits. This tendency can be a problem if subnational governments and their creditors expect or rely on bailouts by the central government. Econometric evidence from 32 large industrial and developing countries indicates that higher subnational spending and deficits lead to greater national deficits. Dillinger and Webb investigate how, and how successfully, Argentina and Brazil dealt with these problems in the 1990s. In both countries, subnational governments account for about half of public spending and are vigorous democracies in most (especially the largest) jurisdictions. The return to democracy in the 1980s revived and strengthened long-standing federal practices while weakening macroeconomic performance, resulting in unsustainable fiscal deficits, high inflation, sometimes hyperinflation, and low or negative growth. Occasional stabilization plans failed within a few years. Then Argentina (in 1991) and Brazil (in 1994) introduced successful stabilization plans. National issues were important in preventing and then bringing about macroeconomic stabilization, but so were intergovernmental fiscal relations and the fiscal management of subnational governments. State deficits and federal transfers were often out of control in the 1980s, contributing to national macroeconomic problems. Stabilization programs in the 1990s needed to establish control, and self-control, over subnational spending and borrowing. This paper-a product of Poverty Reduction and Economic Management, Latin America and the Caribbean Region-is part of the LCR regional studies program on fiscal decentralization in Latin America. The authors may be contacted at wdillingerworldbank.org or swebb@worldbank.org
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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    MPI Ethno. Forsch.
  • 3
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    Online Resource
    Stabilizing Intergovernmental Transfers in Latin America : A Complement to National/Subnational Fiscal Rules? (2002)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (36 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Gonzalez, Y. Christian Stabilizing Intergovernmental Transfers in Latin America
    Keywords: Access To Capital ; Bank Policy ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Business Cycle ; Capital Accounts ; Capital Flows ; Capital Markets ; Consumption Smoothing ; Contingent Liability ; Debt Markets ; Developing Countries ; Developing Country ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Intergovernmental Fiscal ; Municipal Financial Management ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Public and Municipal Finance ; Urban Development ; Urban Economics ; Access To Capital ; Bank Policy ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Business Cycle ; Capital Accounts ; Capital Flows ; Capital Markets ; Consumption Smoothing ; Contingent Liability ; Debt Markets ; Developing Countries ; Developing Country ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Intergovernmental Fiscal ; Municipal Financial Management ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Public and Municipal Finance ; Urban Development ; Urban Economics ; Access To Capital ; Bank Policy ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Business Cycle ; Capital Accounts ; Capital Flows ; Capital Markets ; Consumption Smoothing ; Contingent Liability ; Debt Markets ; Developing Countries ; Developing Country ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Intergovernmental Fiscal ; Municipal Financial Management ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Public and Municipal Finance ; Urban Development ; Urban Economics
    Abstract: The traditional theory of fiscal federalism assigns the role of macroeconomic stabilization to the federal government. In addition to this long-standing theoretical result, there is empirical observation that federal governments in developing countries typically have cheaper and more stable access to capital markets, relative to subnational governments. Drawing on the recent experience of four large federal countries in Latin America—Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico—Gonzalez, Rosenblatt, and Webb examine how intergovernmental transfers affect the division of the burden of stabilization across the levels of government, when the nation as a whole faces economic fluctuations. Imposing stabilizing rules on federal transfers that protect subnational governments from fluctuations in the business cycle can serve two purposes. During boom periods, stabilizing rules prevent subnational governments' tendency to increase inflexible expenditures. And during downturns, stabilizing rules place the burden of borrowing at the federal level—the level most appropriate for macroeconomic stabilization and often the level with superior access to credit. Despite the logic of these rules, recent experience of the four countries reveals that these rules can be risky, particularly in the face of high GDP volatility. Protection against falling revenues in the downturn constitutes a contingent liability for the central government. Argentina's stabilizing rule contributed to fiscal and political tensions during its ongoing crisis. Colombia is beginning to implement similar rules. Meanwhile, Brazilian and Mexican transfers do not implement such rules and fiscal and economic results do not appear to have fared any worse for this absence. The authors draw on the country experience to establish that certain conditions should be in place before establishing a stabilization rule to federal-to-subnational fiscal transfers—in particular the elimination of long-term structural fiscal imbalances, either within levels of government or across levels of government. This paper—a joint product of the Office of the Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, Development Economics, and the Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela Country Department, Latin America and the Caribbean Region—is part of a larger effort in the Bank to draw on lessons from cross-country experience on fiscal federalism. The authors may be contacted at cgonzalezworldbank.org, drosenblatt@worldbank.org, or swebb@worldbank.org
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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