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  • 1
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (36 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Kaplan, David S Enforceability of Labor Law
    Keywords: Adjudication ; Assets ; Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress ; Confidence ; Corruption ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Information Security and Privacy ; Judicial process ; Judicial system ; Law and Development ; Lawyer ; Lawyers ; Legal Products ; Legal framework ; Microfinance ; Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures ; Trial ; Adjudication ; Assets ; Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress ; Confidence ; Corruption ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Information Security and Privacy ; Judicial process ; Judicial system ; Law and Development ; Lawyer ; Lawyers ; Legal Products ; Legal framework ; Microfinance ; Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures ; Trial ; Adjudication ; Assets ; Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress ; Confidence ; Corruption ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Information Security and Privacy ; Judicial process ; Judicial system ; Law and Development ; Lawyer ; Lawyers ; Legal Products ; Legal framework ; Microfinance ; Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures ; Trial
    Abstract: The authors analyze lawsuits involving publicly-appointed lawyers in a labor court in Mexico to study how a rigid law is enforced. They show that, even after a judge has awarded something to a worker alleging unjust dismissal, the award goes uncollected 56 percent of the time. Workers who are dismissed after working more than seven years, however, do not leave these awards uncollected because their legally-mandated severance payments are larger. A simple theoretical model is used to generate predictions on how lawsuit outcomes should depend on the information available to the worker and on the worker's cost of collecting an award after trial, both of which are determined in part by the worker's lawyer. Differences in outcomes across lawyers are consistent with the hypothesis that firms take advantage both of workers who are poorly informed and of workers who find it more costly to collect an award after winning at trial
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 2
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (40 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Kaplan, David S Litigation And Settlement
    Keywords: Arbitration ; Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress ; Claim ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Information Security and Privacy ; Judgments ; Labor Courts ; Labor Markets ; Law Enforcement Systems ; Law and Development ; Legal Environment ; Multiple Claimants ; Private Law ; Private Parties ; Public Disclosure ; Settlement ; Settlements ; Social Protections and Labor ; Arbitration ; Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress ; Claim ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Information Security and Privacy ; Judgments ; Labor Courts ; Labor Markets ; Law Enforcement Systems ; Law and Development ; Legal Environment ; Multiple Claimants ; Private Law ; Private Parties ; Public Disclosure ; Settlement ; Settlements ; Social Protections and Labor ; Arbitration ; Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress ; Claim ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Information Security and Privacy ; Judgments ; Labor Courts ; Labor Markets ; Law Enforcement Systems ; Law and Development ; Legal Environment ; Multiple Claimants ; Private Law ; Private Parties ; Public Disclosure ; Settlement ; Settlements ; Social Protections and Labor
    Abstract: Using a newly assembled data set on procedures filed in Mexican labor tribunals, the authors of this paper study the determinants of final awards to workers. On average, workers recover less than 30 percent of their claim. The strongest result is that workers receive higher percentages of their claims in settlements than in trial judgments. It is also found that cases with multiple claimants against a single firm are less likely to be settled, which partially explains why workers involved in these procedures receive lower percentages of their claims. Finally, the authors find evidence that a worker who exaggerates his or her claim is less likely to settle
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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