ISBN:
9789400719231
Sprache:
Englisch
Seiten:
Online-Ressource (XVI, 346p. 59 illus, digital)
Serie:
Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science 23
Serie:
SpringerLink
Serie:
Bücher
Paralleltitel:
Buchausg. u.d.T.
Schlagwort(e):
Philosophy (General)
;
Genetic epistemology
;
Logic
;
Information theory
;
Philosophy
;
Philosophy (General)
;
Genetic epistemology
;
Logic
;
Information theory
Kurzfassung:
The relation between logic and knowledge has been at the heart of a lively debate since the 1960s. On the one hand, the epistemic approaches based their formal arguments in the mathematics of Brouwer and intuitionistic logic. Following Michael Dummett, they started to call themselves 'antirealists'. Others persisted with the formal background of the Frege-Tarski tradition, where Cantorian set theory is linked via model theory to classical logic. Jaakko Hintikka tried to unify both traditions by means of what is now known as 'explicit epistemic logic'. Under this view, epistemic contents are in
Kurzfassung:
The relation between logic and knowledge has been at the heart of a lively debate since the 1960s. On the one hand, the epistemic approaches based their formal arguments in the mathematics of Brouwer and intuitionistic logic. Following Michael Dummett, they started to call themselves 'antirealists'. Others persisted with the formal background of the Frege-Tarski tradition, where Cantorian set theory is linked via model theory to classical logic. Jaakko Hintikka tried to unify both traditions by means of what is now known as 'explicit epistemic logic'. Under this view, epistemic contents are in
Beschreibung / Inhaltsverzeichnis:
Preface; Acknowledgements; Contents; Contributors; 1 On When a Disjunction Is Informative; Patrick Allo; 1.1 Pluralism About Consequence and Content; 1.2 Situated and Worldly Content; 1.3 Factual and Constraining Content; 1.4 Modelling Content; 1.5 Three Objections Revisited; 1.5.1 Burgess' Objection; 1.5.2 Read's Objection; 1.5.3 Priest's Objection; 1.6 Conclusion: A Realist's Pluralism; References; 2 My Own Truth; Alexandre Billon; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The Truth-Teller Is Context-Sensitive; 2.3 The Truth-Teller Is Relative; 2.4 Other Pathologies of Self-Reference
Beschreibung / Inhaltsverzeichnis:
2.4.1 The Liar2.4.2 Other Semantic Pathologies; 2.4.3 Immunity to Revenge Problems; 2.5 Dissolutions, Cassations and Resolutions; References; 3 Which Logic for the Radical Anti-realist?; Denis Bonnay and Mikaël Cozic; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 From Anti-realism to Substructural Logic; 3.2.1 Moderate Anti-realism; 3.2.2 Radical Anti-realism; 3.3 Life Without Structural Rules; 3.4 The Anti-realist Justification of Substructural Logic; 3.4.1 High-Level Revisionism; 3.4.2 Low-Level Revisionism; 3.5 A Way Out for Radical Anti-realism?; 3.6 Conclusion; References
Beschreibung / Inhaltsverzeichnis:
4 Moore's Paradox as an Argument Against Anti-realismJon Cogburn; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Moorean Validity and Proof Theoretic Semantics; 4.3 On the Inadvisability of Biting the Bullett; 4.3.1 Antirealists Should Reject Unrestricted Moorean Validity; 4.4 A New Restriction Strategy; 4.4.1 Proof That i's Conclusion Is Inconsistent with Unrestricted Moorean Validity; 4.4.2 The Classicist Also Needs the Proposed Restriction; 4.5 Is Antirealism a Moorean Validity? Reflections on Fitch's Proof and Dummett's Program; 4.5.1 Fitch Style Proof of Fitch's Paradox
Beschreibung / Inhaltsverzeichnis:
4.6 Further Reflections on Fitch's Proof4.6.1 A Regimentation of Brogaard and Salerno's Argument Against Tennant; 4.6.2 The Same Argument Without Tennant's Principle; 4.7 Berkeley and Davidson's Use of Moorean Validities; References; 5 The Neutrality of Truth in the Debate Realism vs. Anti-realism; María J. Frápolli; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Truth; 5.3 Realism and Antirealism; 5.4 The Prosentential View; 5.4.1 The Semantic Functions of the Truth Predicate; 5.5 The Syntactic Function of the Truth Predicate; 5.6 The Pragmatic Function of the Truth Predicate
Beschreibung / Inhaltsverzeichnis:
5.7 Epistemology and MetaphysicsReferences; 6 Modalities Without Worlds; Reinhard Kahle; 6.1 Modal Logic; 6.2 Possible Worlds Semantics; 6.3 The Role of Semantics; 6.4 Criticism of Modal Logic; 6.5 An Alternative Analysis of Modalities: Possibility; 6.5.1 Possibility as Independence; 6.5.2 Epistemic Possibility; 6.5.3 The Future; 6.5.4 Ontological Modesty; 6.5.5 A Cross Check; 6.6 An Alternative Analysis of Modalities: Necessity; 6.6.1 Necessity as Binary Relation; 6.6.2 Variety of Alternatives; 6.6.3 Unary Necessity; 6.6.4 The Normative Nature of Unary Necessity
Beschreibung / Inhaltsverzeichnis:
6.7 The Temporal Aspect
Anmerkung:
Includes bibliographical references and index
DOI:
10.1007/978-94-007-1923-1
URL:
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