ISBN:
9789400739833
,
1280798971
,
9781280798979
Language:
English
Pages:
Online-Ressource (XVI, 298p. 17 illus, digital)
Series Statement:
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 28
Series Statement:
SpringerLink
Series Statement:
Bücher
Parallel Title:
Buchausg. u.d.T.
Keywords:
Philosophy (General)
;
Philosophy of nature
;
Science Philosophy
;
Philosophy
;
Philosophy (General)
;
Philosophy of nature
;
Science Philosophy
;
Erkenntnistheorie
;
Logik
;
Wissenschaft
;
Metaphysik
Abstract:
James Maclaurin
Abstract:
Rationis Defensor is to be a volume of previously unpublished essays celebrating the life and work of Colin Cheyne. Colin was until recently Head of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Otago, a department that can boast of many famous philosophers among its past and present faculty and which has twice been judged as the strongest research department across all disciplines in governmental research assessments. Colin is the immediate past President of the Australasian Association for Philosophy (New Zealand Division). He is the author of Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects: Causal Objections to Platonism (Springer, 2001) and the editor, with Vladimir Svoboda and Bjorn Jespersen, of Pavel Tichy's Collected Papers in Logic and Philosophy (University of Otago Press, 2005) and, with John Worrall, of Rationality and Reality: Conversations with Alan Musgrave (Springer, 2006). This volume celebrates the dedication to rational enquiry and the philosophical style of Colin Cheyne. It also celebrates the distinctive brand of naturalistic philosophy for which Otago has become known. Contributors to the volume include a wide variety of philosophers, all with a personal connection to Colin, and all of whom are, in their own way, defenders of rationality.
Description / Table of Contents:
Rationis Defensor; Foreword; Preface; Acknowledgements; Contents; Contributors; Part I: In Epistemology; Chapter 1: Getting Over Gettier; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 The Gettier Problem; 1.3 Externalism; References; Chapter 2: Justified Believing: Avoiding the Paradox; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Cheyne´s Alleged Paradox; 2.3 Two Internalist Conceptions of Justification; 2.3.1 Subjectively Justified Acts of Believing; 2.3.2 Objectively Justified Acts of Believing; 2.3.3 Related Distinctions; 2.4 Internalism and the Paradox; 2.4.1 Subjective (Deontological) Justification; 2.4.2 Objective Justification
Description / Table of Contents:
2.5 ConclusionReferences; Chapter 3: Literature and Truthfulness; References; Chapter 4: The Buck-Passing Stops Here; 4.1 Scanlon´s Buck-Passing Arguments; 4.2 Extensions of Scanlon´s Arguments; 4.3 Reversals of Scanlon´s Arguments; 4.4 Further Extensions and Reversals; 4.5 Options for Scanlon; 4.6 Wide Issues; References; Part II: In Science; Chapter 5: Universal Darwinism: Its Scope and Limits; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Part One: The Paradox of Selection; 5.2.1 A Red Herring; 5.3 Part Two: A Profusion of Evolutionary Analyses; 5.3.1 The Problem of Non-genetic Inheritance
Description / Table of Contents:
5.3.2 Approach One: The Extended Phenotype5.3.3 Approach Two: Memes; 5.3.4 Approach Three: Dual Inheritance; 5.3.5 Approach Four: Developmental Systems Theory; 5.3.6 Approach Five: Extended Replicator Theory; 5.3.7 Why Are There So Many Approaches?; 5.4 Part Three: Natural Selection Meets Functionalism; 5.4.1 Evolution´s Turing Test; 5.5 Conclusions; References; Chapter 6: The Future of Utilitarianism; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 The Broken World; 6.3 Two Models of Intergenerational Justice; 6.4 Towards Moderate Consequentialism; 6.4.1 Hooker´s Rule Consequentialism; 6.5 The Lexical Threshold
Description / Table of Contents:
6.5.1 Ollie and the Oyster6.6 Lexical Thresholds in a Broken World; 6.7 Three Moderate Consequentialist Tricks; 6.7.1 First Trick. A Background of Innocence; 6.7.2 Second Trick. A Background of Entitlement; 6.7.3 Third Trick. A Liberal Ideal Code; References; Chapter 7: Kant on Experiment; 7.1 Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke; 7.2 Experiments and Hypotheses; 7.2.1 Experiments, Hypotheses, and Preliminary Judgements; 7.2.2 Hypotheses and Induction; 7.2.3 Hypotheses, Certainty, and Probability; 7.2.4 The Three Requirements for a Good Hypothesis; 7.3 Experiments and the Laws of Nature
Description / Table of Contents:
7.4 Experiments and Heuristic Principles7.5 Conclusion; References; Chapter 8: Did Newton Feign the Corpuscular Hypothesis?; 8.1 Introduction; 8.2 Experimental Philosophy and the Royal Society; 8.3 Newton´s First Optical Paper; 8.4 Newton´s Method of Hypotheses; 8.5 Newton´s Corpuscular Hypothesis; 8.6 Conclusion; References; Chapter 9: The Progress of Scotland and the Experimental Method; 9.1 Introduction; 9.2 The Experimental/Speculative Distinction; 9.3 Bacon´s New Atlantis and Philosophical Societies; 9.4 The Evidence; 9.5 The Progress of Scotland; References; Part III: In Metaphysics
Description / Table of Contents:
Chapter 10: Propositions: Truth vs. Existence
Note:
Description based upon print version of record
DOI:
10.1007/978-94-007-3983-3
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