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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Learning from Experience : Volume IV: Lessons from Australia's Collins Submarine Program (2011)
    [Erscheinungsort nicht ermittelbar] : RAND Corporation
    Details
    ISBN: 9780833077578 , 9780833058980
    Language: Undetermined
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource
    Keywords: Australasian & Pacific history ; Treaties & other sources of international law ; Military engineering
    Abstract: This volume presents a set of lessons learned from Australia’s Collins submarine program that could help inform future program managers. Collins was the first submarine built in Australia. RAND investigated how operational requirements were set for the Collins class; explored the acquisition, contracting, design, and build processes that the program employed; and assessed the activities surrounding integrated logistics support for the class
    Note: English
    URL: kostenfrei
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    MPI Ethno. Forsch.
  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Learning from experience : Volume II: Lessons from the U.S. Navy's Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia submarine programs (2011)
    Santa Monica, CA : RAND
    Details
    ISBN: 9780833059031 , 0833059033 , 9780833077561 , 0833077562 , 9780833058966 , 0833058967
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xxxi, 121 pages)
    DDC: 623.82574
    Keywords: United States Procurement ; Seawolf (Submarine) ; United States ; Seawolf (Submarine) ; Nuclear submarines Design and construction ; Shipbuilding industry Management ; Nuclear submarines Planning ; Nuclear submarines ; Shipbuilding industry ; Nuclear submarines ; United States ; Seawolf (Submarine) ; United States ; Armed Forces ; Procurement ; Shipbuilding industry ; Management ; Electronic books
    Abstract: Large, complex submarine design and construction programs demand personnel with unique skills and capabilities supplemented with practical experiences in their areas of expertise. Recognizing the importance of past experiences for successful program management, the U.S. Navy asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from previous submarine programs that could help inform future program managers. This volume presents lessons from three submarine programs. The RAND team looked at how the programs were managed, the issues that affected management decisions, and the outcomes of those decisions. All three submarine programs had tenuous beginnings. Each experienced cost overruns and schedule delays in the construction of its first-of-class submarine. The Ohio and Virginia programs made corrections, and both are viewed as generally successful. Seawolf, probably due to the changing threat and budgetary environment, was terminated before changes could be made to correct early missteps. An overarching lesson from the three programs is the importance of program stability. Stability applies in many areas--funding consistency, a long-term build strategy, fixed operational requirements, program management, and an integrated partnership between the Navy and the shipbuilders
    Abstract: Large, complex submarine design and construction programs demand personnel with unique skills and capabilities supplemented with practical experiences in their areas of expertise. Recognizing the importance of past experiences for successful program management, the U.S. Navy asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from previous submarine programs that could help inform future program managers. This volume presents lessons from three submarine programs. The RAND team looked at how the programs were managed, the issues that affected management decisions, and the outcomes of those decisions. All three submarine programs had tenuous beginnings. Each experienced cost overruns and schedule delays in the construction of its first-of-class submarine. The Ohio and Virginia programs made corrections, and both are viewed as generally successful. Seawolf, probably due to the changing threat and budgetary environment, was terminated before changes could be made to correct early missteps. An overarching lesson from the three programs is the importance of program stability. Stability applies in many areas--funding consistency, a long-term build strategy, fixed operational requirements, program management, and an integrated partnership between the Navy and the shipbuilders
    Note: "This research was conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute"--Pg. IV , "RAND National Defense Research Institute , Includes bibliographical references (pages 117-121)
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: kostenfrei
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    MPI Ethno. Forsch.
  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Learning from experience : Volume IV: Lessons from Australia's Collins submarine programs (2011)
    Santa Monica, CA : RAND
    Details
    ISBN: 9780833059031 , 0833059033 , 9780833077578 , 0833077570 , 9780833058980 , 0833058983
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (xxvi, 59 pages)
    DDC: 359.03
    Keywords: Australia Procurement ; Collins Class (Submarine) ; Australia ; Collins Class (Submarine) ; Submarines (Ships) Planning ; Submarines (Ships) Design and construction ; Shipbuilding industry Management ; Submarines (Ships) ; Submarines (Ships) ; Shipbuilding industry ; Australia ; Australia ; Shipbuilding industry ; Management ; Submarines (Ships) ; Design and construction ; Armed Forces ; Procurement ; Electronic books
    Abstract: Large, complex submarine design and construction programs demand personnel with unique skills and capabilities supplemented with practical experiences in their areas of expertise. Recognizing the importance of past experiences for successful program management, the Australian government asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from its Collins submarine program that could help inform future program managers. Collins was the first submarine built in Australia. RAND investigated how operational requirements were set for the Collins class; explored the acquisition, contracting, design, and build processes that the program employed; and assessed the plans and activities surrounding integrated logistics support for the class. Although Australia had intended to take an evolutionary approach in procuring the Collins class by using an existing design, no design was suitable, so the program pursued a developmental platform and a developmental combat system. This introduced a high degree of risk into the program, particularly in the combat system technology. Among the important lessons: All appropriate organizations should be involved in a new submarine program from its inception, the majority of the design drawings should be completed before construction begins, and a thorough and adequate testing program should be developed. Because designing and building a submarine is one of the most complex undertakings for a new program, they require careful management and oversight
    Abstract: Large, complex submarine design and construction programs demand personnel with unique skills and capabilities supplemented with practical experiences in their areas of expertise. Recognizing the importance of past experiences for successful program management, the Australian government asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from its Collins submarine program that could help inform future program managers. Collins was the first submarine built in Australia. RAND investigated how operational requirements were set for the Collins class; explored the acquisition, contracting, design, and build processes that the program employed; and assessed the plans and activities surrounding integrated logistics support for the class. Although Australia had intended to take an evolutionary approach in procuring the Collins class by using an existing design, no design was suitable, so the program pursued a developmental platform and a developmental combat system. This introduced a high degree of risk into the program, particularly in the combat system technology. Among the important lessons: All appropriate organizations should be involved in a new submarine program from its inception, the majority of the design drawings should be completed before construction begins, and a thorough and adequate testing program should be developed. Because designing and building a submarine is one of the most complex undertakings for a new program, they require careful management and oversight
    Note: "RAND National Defense Research Institute , "This research was conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute"--Pg. IV , Includes bibliographical references (pages 57-59)
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: kostenfrei
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    MPI Ethno. Forsch.
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