ISBN:
9781441958099
,
1282927698
,
9781282927698
Language:
English
Pages:
Online-Ressource (XII, 284 p, digital)
Edition:
1
Series Statement:
Studies in Public Choice 16
Series Statement:
SpringerLink
Series Statement:
Bücher
Parallel Title:
Buchausg. u.d.T. Reform processes and policy change
Keywords:
Social sciences
;
Political science Philosophy
;
Social Sciences
;
Social sciences
;
Political science Philosophy
;
Political science
;
Demokratie
;
Politischer Prozess
;
Politische Entscheidung
;
Politische Reform
;
Veto
;
Demokratie
;
Politischer Prozess
;
Politische Entscheidung
;
Politische Reform
;
Veto
Abstract:
George Tsebelis` veto players approach has become a prominent theory to analyze various research questions in political science. Studies that apply veto player theory deal with the impact of institutions and partisan preferences of legislative activity and policy outcomes. It is used to measure the degree of policy change and, thus, reform capacity in national and international political systems. This volume contains the analysis of leading scholars in the field on these topics and more recent developments regarding theoretical and empirical progress in the area of political reform-making. The contributions come from research areas of political science where veto player theory plays a significant role, including, positive political theory, legislative behavior and legislative decision-making in national and supra-national political systems, policy making and government formation. The contributors to this book add to the current scholarly and public debate on the role of veto players, making it of interest to scholars in political science and policy studies as well as policymakers worldwide.
Description / Table of Contents:
Reform Processes and Policy Change; Acknowledgements; Contents; Contributors; Part I Introduction; 1 Veto Player Theory and Policy Change: An Introduction; Arguments Made in Veto Players; Arguments Made in This Book; References; Part II Identification of Veto Players; 2 Empirical Applications of Veto Player Analysisand Institutional Effectiveness; Introduction; Veto Players: Definitional Issues; Empirical Application of the Veto Player Approach; Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies; Political Economy Outputs in Developed Countries; Application in Developing Countries
Description / Table of Contents:
Veto Players and InstitutionsThe Role of Veto Players in Institutional Effectiveness; Conclusion; References; 3 The Veto Player Approach in Macro-Comparative Politics: Concepts and Measurement; Conceptualizing and Measuring Veto Players in Macro-comparative Analysis; Competing Concepts of Veto Player and Veto Point Analysis; Measurement and Aggregation of Veto Points in Macro-comparative Analysis; Measurement and Aggregation of Veto Players in Macro-Comparative Analysis; Towards a More Refined Veto Player Analysis; Conclusion; References
Description / Table of Contents:
4 Measuring Policy Positions of Veto Players in Parliamentary DemocraciesStep 1: Identifying Legislative Keywords; Step 2: Smart Tagging Political Texts Using Legislative Keywords; Step 3: Estimate Portfolio Positions; References; Part III Interpretation of Veto Players; 5 Mutual Veto? How Coalitions Work; Delegation in Coalition Governments; How Delegation Works in Coalition Governments; Contract Design; Screening; Reporting and Monitoring; Institutional Checks; How Coalitions Choose Control Mechanisms; Internal Logic of the Coalition's Governance Architecture; Environmental Factors
Description / Table of Contents:
Patterns of Coalition GovernanceEnvironmental Factors; Familiarity; Bargaining Complexity in Parliament; Parliamentary Polarization; Policy Preference Divergence; Time; Institutions; Data and Methods; Results; Conclusion: Mutual Veto?; References; 6 Veto Players, Agenda Control and Cabinet Stabilityin 17 European Parliaments, 1945-1999; Introduction; Cabinet Stability in Cross-national Comparison: Data and Description of the Dependent Variable; Explaining Cabinet Stability: The Story So Far; Veto Players, Agenda Control and Cabinet Duration; Testing the Hypotheses; Discussion of Results
Description / Table of Contents:
ConclusionReferences; 7 The Sources of Bipartisan Politics in Parliamentary Democracies; Introduction; Bipartisan Legislative Activity and Success in Parliamentary Democracies; A Model of Bipartisan Politics; Research Design and Measures; Analysis; Conclusion; References; 8 Why Don't Veto Players Use Their Power?; Veto Players and Voting in the Council: The Empirical Puzzle; Veto Power, Voting Preferences and Consensus: Why Bother?; The DEU Data: Actors' Interests in Contested Commission Proposals; Voting Preferences, Selection Bias and Strategies for Consensus
Description / Table of Contents:
Logrolling Across Proposals Within a Period and Within a Domain
Note:
Includes bibliographical references
DOI:
10.1007/978-1-4419-5809-9
URL:
Volltext
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