ISBN:
9789400906198
Language:
English
Pages:
Online-Ressource (200p)
,
digital
Edition:
Springer eBook Collection. Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
Series Statement:
Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 122
Series Statement:
Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science 122
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
Keywords:
Biology Philosophy
;
Science Philosophy
;
Statistics
;
History
;
Science—Philosophy.
;
Biology—Philosophy.
Abstract:
Method, Theory, and Statistics: The Lesson of Physics -- The Theory of Natural Selection as a Null Theory -- Causality and Exogeneity in econometric models -- Statistics in Expert Resolution: A Theory of Weights for Combining Expert Opinion -- Short and Long Term Survival Analysis in Oncological Research -- A Statistical Approach to the Study of Pollen Fitness -- Statistics in Genetics: Human Migrations Detected by Multivariate Techniques -- Quantum Probability and the Foundations of Quantum Theory -- Indistinguishability, Interchangeability and Indeterminism -- The Non Frequency Approach to Elementary Particle Statistics -- Name Index.
Abstract:
An inference may be defined as a passage of thought according to some method. In the theory of knowledge it is customary to distinguish deductive and non-deductive inferences. Deductive inferences are truth preserving, that is, the truth of the premises is preserved in the con clusion. As a result, the conclusion of a deductive inference is already 'contained' in the premises, although we may not know this fact until the inference is performed. Standard examples of deductive inferences are taken from logic and mathematics. Non-deductive inferences need not preserve truth, that is, 'thought may pass' from true premises to false conclusions. Such inferences can be expansive, or, ampliative in the sense that the performances of such inferences actually increases our putative knowledge. Standard non-deductive inferences do not really exist, but one may think of elementary inductive inferences in which conclusions regarding the future are drawn from knowledge of the past. Since the body of scientific knowledge is increasing, it is obvious that the method of science must allow non-deductive as well as deductive inferences. Indeed, the explosive growth of science in recent times points to a prominent role for the former. Philosophers of science have long tried to isolate and study the non-deductive inferences in science. The inevitability of such inferences one the one hand, juxtaposed with the poverty of all efforts to identify them, constitutes one of the major cognitive embarrassments of our time.
DOI:
10.1007/978-94-009-0619-8
URL:
Volltext
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