ISBN:
978-1-107-12733-3
,
798-1-107-56644-6
Language:
English
Pages:
xv, 237 Seiten
,
Illustrationen, Karten
Series Statement:
Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
Keywords:
Afrika Sambia
;
Führer, politischer
;
Häuptlingstum
;
Regierung
;
Macht
;
Gemeindesoziologie
;
Demokratisierung
;
Konfliktmanagement
;
Rezension
Abstract:
The Paradox of Traditional Chiefs in Democratic Africa shows that unelected traditional leaders can facilitate democratic responsiveness. Ironically, chiefs' undemocratic character gives them a capacity to organize responses to rural problems that elected politicians and state institutions lack. Specifically, chiefs' longer time horizons encourage investment in local institutions that enable the provision of local public goods. This is the paradox of traditional chiefs in democratic Africa: elected politicians can only effectively respond to rural constituents through institutions constructed and maintained by local leaders who are not worried about electoral terms. Furthermore, the critical role played by chiefs in brokering local development projects forces us to reassess how we understand the basis of their political influence during elections. The book examines the effects of traditional leaders on the electoral connection in Africa through a multi-method approach that combines qualitative research, surveys, and experiments, with particular attention to the Zambian case.
Description / Table of Contents:
Section 1. Toward a new theory of chiefs. The paradox of chiefs -- Conceptualizing chiefs -- Traditional leaders and democracy -- Section 2. Chiefs, development and elections in Zambia. Introduction to Zambia -- Chiefs and local public goods provision -- Electoral king makers -- Chiefs and the voter's calculus. -- Section 3. Traditional leaders in Africa and beyond. Chiefs and government responsiveness across Africa -- Development brokers revisited. Appendix A. Construction of cross-national measures of chief's power -- Appendix B. List of interviews and interview protocols -- Appendix C. Data set on local public goods provision and absent chiefs -- Appendix D. Survey of chiefs and chiefdom level data set -- Appendix E. Household survey and experiment. Chiefs as development brokers.
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