ISBN:
9789400779785
Language:
English
Pages:
1 online resource (357 pages)
Edition:
1st ed.
Series Statement:
Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science Ser. v.33
Parallel Title:
Erscheint auch als
DDC:
111.8
Keywords:
Vagueness (Philosophy)
;
Ontology
;
Aufsatzsammlung
Abstract:
This unique anthology of new, contributed essays offers a range of perspectives on various aspects of ontic vagueness. It seeks to answer core questions pertaining to onticism, the view that vagueness exists in the world itself. The questions to be addressed include whether vague objects must have vague identity, and whether ontic vagueness has a distinctive logic, one that is not shared by semantic or epistemic vagueness. The essays in this volume explain the motivations behind onticism, such as the plausibility of mereological vagueness and indeterminacy in quantum mechanics and they offer various arguments both for and against ontic vagueness; onticism is also compared with other, competing theories of vagueness such as semanticism, the view that vagueness exists only in our linguistic representation of the world.Gareth Evans's influential paper of 1978, "Can There Be Vague Objects" gave a simple but cogent argument against the coherence of ontic vagueness.?Onticism was subsequently dismissed by many. However, in recent years, researchers have become aware of the logical gaps in Evans's argument and this has triggered a new wave of interest in onticism. Onticism is now widely regarded as at least a coherent view. Reflecting this growing consensus, the present anthology for the first time puts together essays that are focused on onticism and its various facets and it fills in the lacuna in the literature on vagueness, a much-discussed subject in contemporary philosop.
Abstract:
Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Contributors -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 Why Onticism? -- 1.1.1 The Argument from Ordinary Objects -- 1.1.2 The Argument from Semantic Indeterminacy -- 1.1.3 The Argument from Quantum Mechanics -- 1.2 Why Not Onticism? Evans's Argument -- 1.3 Ontic Vagueness: Vague Objects, Vague Existence, and Vague Identity -- 1.3.1 Vagueness vs. Indeterminacy -- 1.3.2 Vague Objects vs. Vague Properties -- 1.3.3 Vague Existence -- 1.3.4 Vague Identity -- 1.4 Summaries of the Chapters Included -- 1.4.1 Part I: Mereological Vagueness -- 1.4.2 Part II: Varieties of Ontic Vagueness -- 1.4.3 Part III: Formal Issues -- 1.4.4 Part IV: Ontic Supervaluationism -- 1.4.5 Part V: Vague Identity -- References -- Part I: Mereological Vagueness -- Chapter 2: Mereological Indeterminacy: Metaphysical but Not Fundamental -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Fundamental Indeterminacy De Re -- 2.3 Derivative Indeterminacy De Re -- 2.3.1 Ordinary Objects with Multiple Individual Forms -- 2.3.2 Formal Indeterminacy De Re and Absolute Determinacy De Re -- 2.3.3 Vague Ordinary Objects -- References -- Chapter 3: A Linguistic Account of Mereological Vagueness -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Vague Singular Terms -- 3.3 Vague Mereological Terms -- 3.4 Other Accounts of Vagueness -- 3.5 Conclusion -- References -- Part II: Varieties of Ontic Vagueness -- Chapter 4: Vague Objects in Quantum Mechanics? -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Vague Identity: Evans's Argument and the Analysis Thread -- 4.2.1 Evans's Argument -- 4.2.2 The Connection with Quantum Mechanics -- 4.2.3 A Minor Worry -- 4.2.4 Summary of the Analysis Thread -- 4.2.4.1 Two Options -- 4.2.5 Option 1: One or Both of `a' and `b' Are Imprecise -- 4.2.5.1 Way 1 -- 4.2.5.2 Way 2 -- 4.2.5.3 Way 3 -- 4.2.6 Option 2: Both `a' and `b' Are Precise -- 4.3 Nonindividuality: French and Krause -- 4.3.1 Veiled Objects.
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