ISBN:
0585474478
,
9780585474472
Language:
English
Pages:
Online Ressource (vii, 218 p.)
Edition:
Online-Ausg.
Series Statement:
Current research in the semantics / pragmatics interface v. 4
Series Statement:
Current research in the semantics/pragmatics interface v. 4
Parallel Title:
Print version Pragmatics of propositional attitude reports
DDC:
306.44
Keywords:
Pragmatique
;
Proposition (Logique)
;
Attitude (Psychologie)
;
Pragmatics
;
Proposition (Logic)
;
Attitude (Psychology)
;
Proposition (Logic)
;
Pragmatics
;
Attitude (Psychology)
;
Proposición (Lógica)
;
Actitud (Psicología)
;
Pragmatics
;
Proposition (Logic)
;
Propositionele attitudes
;
Philology & Linguistics
;
Languages & Literatures
;
LANGUAGE ARTS & DISCIPLINES ; Linguistics ; Sociolinguistics
;
Attitude (Psychology)
;
Electronic books
;
Electronic books
;
Aufsatzsammlung
;
Aufsatzsammlung
Abstract:
Introduction:Belief reports and pragmatic theory: the state of the art /K.M. Jaszczolt --Propositional attitudes in direct-reference semantics /S. Schiffer --Interpreted logical forms, belief attribution, and the dynamic lexicon /P. Ludlow --Beyond sense and reference: an alternative response to the problem of opacity /L. Clapp --How do we know what Galileo said? /M.J. Cresswell --A puzzle about belief reports /K. Bach --Do belief reports report beliefs? /K. Bach --Attitude ascriptions, context and interpretive resemblance /A. Bezuidenhout --The default-based context-dependence of belief reports /K.M. Jaszczolt --The background of propositional attitudes and reports thereof /D.W. Smith.
Note:
Includes bibliographical references and indexes. - Description based on print version record
,
Introduction:Belief reports and pragmatic theory: the state of the art
,
Propositional attitudes in direct-reference semantics
,
Interpreted logical forms, belief attribution, and the dynamic lexicon
,
Beyond sense and reference: an alternative response to the problem of opacity
,
How do we know what Galileo said?
,
A puzzle about belief reports
,
Do belief reports report beliefs?
,
Attitude ascriptions, context and interpretive resemblance
,
The default-based context-dependence of belief reports
,
The background of propositional attitudes and reports thereof
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