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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Privatization and Regulation of Transport Infrastructure in the 1990s : Successes . . . and Bugs to Fix for the Next Mille (1999)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (42 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Privatization and Regulation of Transport Infrastructure in the 1990s
    Keywords: Air ; Airports ; Bus ; Costs ; Driving ; Infrastructure Projects ; Private Transport ; Public Works ; Rail ; Railways ; Roads ; Safety ; Toll ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Activity ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Transport Infrastructure ; Transport Infrastructures ; Transport Operators ; Transport Policies ; Transport Projects ; Air ; Airports ; Bus ; Costs ; Driving ; Infrastructure Projects ; Private Transport ; Public Works ; Rail ; Railways ; Roads ; Safety ; Toll ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Activity ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Transport Infrastructure ; Transport Infrastructures ; Transport Operators ; Transport Policies ; Transport Projects
    Abstract: Learning to regulate fairly, effectively, and at arm's length may be the main challenge governments face in attracting private investment and financing to the transport sector. - Governments should increasingly be able to rely on the private sector for help supporting (and financing) the transport sector - especially infrastructure support services for which there is heavy demand - but first they must improve their regulatory tools and sort out the institutional mess surrounding the regulatory process. Some countries have put together creative restructuring models and financing designs that tap potential in the private sector. Roads will continue to need significant public funding, but there are innovative ways (including shadow tolls) to attract private financing for road maintenance and investment. Partnerships between the public and private sectors have remained largely untapped at ports and airports. To attract more private capital to the sector, regulators must know the cost of capital, know how to be fair to captive shippers, and have a better handle on demand - so they have more credibility when conflicts arise. Governments have overemphasized making deals and have generally underestimated the difficulty of taking on their new job as regulators. They are increasingly switching to contract-based regulation, to firm up the commitments of all parties involved, but are not adequately emphasizing contract design that anticipates problems and addresses unpredictable situations. This increases the risk of arbitrary regulatory rulings, which increases regulatory and political risks, which raises the expected rate of return required by potential investors. And all that makes future projects costlier or more difficult, adding to the effects of the 1998-99 financial crisis. As a result of increased risk, the two groups most interested in the sector are: · Large, strong operators in the sector - typically in tandem with local construction companies - that feel confident they can take on regulators in case of conflict. · Risk-takers carving a niche for themselves. Either way, taxpayers and transport users are exposed to government, regulator, or operator failures that result in contract renegotiations (the norm, rather than the exception, in transport infrastructure projects). Gains from privatization might not reach consumers, simply because governments are ignoring the importance of ensuring fair distribution of long-run gains through the early creation of independent and accountable regulatory institutions that work closely with effective competition agencies. This paper - a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute - is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation. The author may be contacted at aestacheworldbank.org
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    A "Research" Database On Infrastructure Economic Performance, Vol. 1 of 2 (2005)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (152 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio A "Research" Database On Infrastructure Economic Performance, Vol. 1 of 2
    Keywords: Aircraft ; Cellular Telephones ; Costs ; E-Business ; Energy ; Energy Production and Transportation ; Fuel ; Fuels ; ICT Policy and Strategies ; Information and Communication Technologies ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure Regulation ; International Transport ; Poverty Monitoring and Analysis ; Poverty Reduction ; Private Sector Development ; Rail ; Railways ; Rebates ; Roads ; Sanitation ; Tax ; Taxes ; Town Water Supply and Sani ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Water Supply and Sanitation ; Aircraft ; Cellular Telephones ; Costs ; E-Business ; Energy ; Energy Production and Transportation ; Fuel ; Fuels ; ICT Policy and Strategies ; Information and Communication Technologies ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure Regulation ; International Transport ; Poverty Monitoring and Analysis ; Poverty Reduction ; Private Sector Development ; Rail ; Railways ; Rebates ; Roads ; Sanitation ; Tax ; Taxes ; Town Water Supply and Sani ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Water Supply and Sanitation ; Aircraft ; Cellular Telephones ; Costs ; E-Business ; Energy ; Energy Production and Transportation ; Fuel ; Fuels ; ICT Policy and Strategies ; Information and Communication Technologies ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure Regulation ; International Transport ; Poverty Monitoring and Analysis ; Poverty Reduction ; Private Sector Development ; Rail ; Railways ; Rebates ; Roads ; Sanitation ; Tax ; Taxes ; Town Water Supply and Sani ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Water Supply and Sanitation
    Abstract: The authors present an infrastructure database that was assembled from multiple sources. Its main purposes are: (1) to provide a snapshot of the sector as of the end of 2004; and (2) to facilitate quantitative analytical research on infrastructure. The paper includes definitions, source information, and the most recent data available for 37 performance indicators that proxy access, affordability, and quality of service. Additionally, the database includes a snapshot of 15 reform indicators across infrastructure sectors
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  • 3
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    Online Resource
    Universal Service Obligations in Utility Concession Contracts and the Needs of the Poor in Argentina's Privatizations (1999)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (32 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Universal Service Obligations in Utility Concession Contracts and the Needs of the Poor in Argentina's Privatizations
    Keywords: Bank ; Communities & Human Settlements ; Consumer ; Consumers ; Customers ; Debt Markets ; Demand ; Disabilities ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Energy ; Energy Production and Transportation ; Expenses ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Housing and Human Habitats ; Income ; Income Level ; Industry ; Investment ; Lack Of Interest ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Pensioners ; Population ; Private Sector Development ; Profits ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Savings ; Subsidies ; Supply ; Technology Industry ; Valuable ; Valuation ; Worth ; Bank ; Communities & Human Settlements ; Consumer ; Consumers ; Customers ; Debt Markets ; Demand ; Disabilities ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Energy ; Energy Production and Transportation ; Expenses ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Housing and Human Habitats ; Income ; Income Level ; Industry ; Investment ; Lack Of Interest ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Pensioners ; Population ; Private Sector Development ; Profits ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Savings ; Subsidies ; Supply ; Technology Industry ; Valuable ; Valuation ; Worth
    Abstract: The structural changes that come with privatization may induce a reconsideration of the regulations defined during the early stages of privatization. - Chisari and Estache summarize the main lessons emerging from Argentina's experience, including universal service obligations in concession contracts. They discuss free-riding risks, moral hazard problems, and other issues that arise when social concerns are delegated to private operators. After reporting on Argentina's experience, Chisari and Estache suggest some guidelines: · Anticipate interjurisdictional externalities. Users' mobility makes targeting service obligations difficult. · Minimize the risks imposed by elusive demand. In providing new services, a gradual policy may work better than a shock. · Realize that unemployment leads to delinquency and lower expected tariffs. Elasticity of fixed and usage charges is important. · Deal with the fact that the poor have limited access to credit. Ultimately, plans that included credit for the payment of infrastructure charges were not that successful. · Coordinate regulatory, employment, and social policy. One successful plan to provide universal service involved employing workers from poor families in infrastructure extension works. · Beware of the latent opportunism of users who benefit from special programs. Special treatment of a sector may encourage free-riding (for example, pensioners overused the telephone until a limit was placed on the number of subsidized phone calls they could make). · Fixed allocations for payment of services do not ensure that universal service obligations will be met. How do you deal with the problem that many pensioners do not pay their bills? · Anticipate that operators will have more information than regulators do. If companies exaggerate supply costs in remote areas, direct interaction with poor users there may lead to the selection of more cost-effective technologies. · Tailored programs are often much more effective than standardized programs. They are clearly more expensive but, when demand-driven, are also more effective. This paper - a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute - is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation. The authors may be contacted at ochisariuade.edu or aestache@worldbank.org
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    The Long and Winding Path to Private Financing and Regulation of Toll Roads (1999)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (54 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio The Long and Winding Path to Private Financing and Regulation of Toll Roads
    Keywords: Arterial Roads ; Costs ; Demand For Road Transport ; Freight ; Highway ; Highway Systems ; Investments ; Piers ; Rail ; Road ; Road Projects ; Road Sector ; Road Transport ; Toll ; Toll Road ; Toll Roads ; Traffic ; Transport ; Transport Activities ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Urban Roads ; Vehicles ; Arterial Roads ; Costs ; Demand For Road Transport ; Freight ; Highway ; Highway Systems ; Investments ; Piers ; Rail ; Road ; Road Projects ; Road Sector ; Road Transport ; Toll ; Toll Road ; Toll Roads ; Traffic ; Transport ; Transport Activities ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Urban Roads ; Vehicles
    Abstract: July 2000 - This guide to the issues at stake when toll roads are privatized answers many questions that privatization teams and regulators should be asking-providing useful information to project specialists, many of whom are now learning how much they did not know when they started. Road transport has long been the dominant form of transport for freight and passenger movement throughout the world. Because most road projects require investments with long amortization periods and because many projects do not generate enough demand to become self-financing through some type of user fee or toll, the road sector remains in the hands of the public sector to a much greater extent than other transport activities. But governments throughout the world, including those of many poor African and South Asian countries, are commercializing their operations to cut costs, improve user orientation, and increase sector-specific revenue. There seems to be demand for toll roads in specific settings, but the problems met by many of this first generation of road concessions-from Mexico to Thailand-have given toll projects a bad reputation. Many mistakes were made, and tolling is obviously not the best solution for every road. Most of the alternatives aim at improving efficiency (lowering costs). But there are many ways of getting the private sector involved in toll roads, thus reducing public sector financing requirements for the sector. Understanding the context in which toll roads are viable is essential both for their initial success and for effective long-run regulation. Estache, Romero, and Strong provide a broad overview of issues at stake from the viewpoint of both privatization teams and regulators responsible for supervising contractual commitments of private operators and the government, to each other and to users. This paper-a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute-is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation. The authors may be contacted at aestacheworldbank.org or jstrong@worldbank.org
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Bidder Asymmetry In Infrastructure Procurement : Are There Any Fringe Bidders? (2008)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (24 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Bidder Asymmetry In Infrastructure Procurement
    Keywords: Affiliated ; Affiliated organizations ; Auction ; Auctions ; Bid ; Bidders ; Bidding ; Competition ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Government Procurement ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; International development ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Private Sector Development ; Public disclosure ; Affiliated ; Affiliated organizations ; Auction ; Auctions ; Bid ; Bidders ; Bidding ; Competition ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Government Procurement ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; International development ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Private Sector Development ; Public disclosure ; Affiliated ; Affiliated organizations ; Auction ; Auctions ; Bid ; Bidders ; Bidding ; Competition ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Government Procurement ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; International development ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Private Sector Development ; Public disclosure
    Abstract: Asymmetric auctions are among the most rapidly growing areas in the auction literature. The potential benefits from improved auction efficiency are expected to be enormous in public procurement auctions related to official development projects. Entrant bidders are considered a key to enhance competition in an auction and break potential collusive arrangements among incumbent bidders. Asymmetric auction theory predicts that weak (fringe) bidders would bid more aggressively when they are faced with a strong (incumbent) opponent. Using official development assistance procurement data, this paper finds that in the major infrastructure sectors, entrants submitted systematically aggressive bids in the presence of an incumbent bidder. The findings also show that a high concentration of incumbents in an auction would harm auction efficiency, raising procurement costs. The results suggest that auctioneers should encourage fringe bidders to actively participate in the bidding process while maintaining the quality of the projects. This is conducive to enhancing competitive circumstances in public procurements and improving allocative efficiency
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  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Joint Bidding In Infrastructure Procurement (2008)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (30 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Joint Bidding In Infrastructure Procurement
    Keywords: Access to Markets ; Affiliated ; Affiliated organizations ; Auction ; Bidding ; Competition ; Competition policy ; Decentralization ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Foreign companies ; Foreign firms ; ICT Policy and Strategies ; Information and Communication Technologies ; International Economics & Trade ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Microfinance ; Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures ; Public disclosure ; Access to Markets ; Affiliated ; Affiliated organizations ; Auction ; Bidding ; Competition ; Competition policy ; Decentralization ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Foreign companies ; Foreign firms ; ICT Policy and Strategies ; Information and Communication Technologies ; International Economics & Trade ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Microfinance ; Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures ; Public disclosure ; Access to Markets ; Affiliated ; Affiliated organizations ; Auction ; Bidding ; Competition ; Competition policy ; Decentralization ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Foreign companies ; Foreign firms ; ICT Policy and Strategies ; Information and Communication Technologies ; International Economics & Trade ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Markets and Market Access ; Microfinance ; Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures ; Public disclosure
    Abstract: To utilize public resources efficiently, it is required to take full advantage of competition in public procurement auctions. Joint bidding practices are one of the possible ways of facilitating auction competition. In theory, there are pros and cons. It may enable firms to pool their financial and experiential resources and remove barriers to entry. On the other hand, it may reduce the degree of competition and can be used as a cover for collusive behavior. The paper empirically addresses whether joint bidding is pro- or anti-competitive in Official Development Assistance procurement auctions for infrastructure projects. It reveals the possible risk of relying too much on a foreign bidding coalition and may suggest the necessity of overseeing it. The data reveal no strong evidence that joint bidding practices are compatible with competition policy, except for a few cases. In road procurements, coalitional bidding involving both local and foreign firms has been found pro-competitive. In the water and sewage sector, local joint bidding may be useful to draw out better offers from potential contractors. Joint bidding composed of only foreign companies is mostly considered anti-competitive
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  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Multidimensionality And Renegotiation : Evidence From Transport-Sector Public-Private-Partnership Transactions In Latin America (2008)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (30 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Multidimensionality And Renegotiation
    Keywords: Costs ; Debt Markets ; Diesel ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Policies ; Railway ; Railway industry ; Road ; Transparency ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; Diesel ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Policies ; Railway ; Railway industry ; Road ; Transparency ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; Diesel ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Policies ; Railway ; Railway industry ; Road ; Transparency ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning
    Abstract: Multidimensional auctions are a natural and practical solution when auctioneers pursue more than one objective in their public-private-partnership transactions. However, it is difficult to achieve auction efficiency with multiple award criteria. Using auction data from road and railway concessions in Latin America, the probability of renegotiation this paper estimates by a two-stage least squares technique with a binary selection in the first-stage regression. The findings show that auctioneers tend to adopt the multidimensional format when the need for social considerations, such as alleviation of unemployment, is high. This implies that such political considerations could hinder efficiency and transparency in auctions. The analysis also shows that the renegotiation risk in infrastructure concessions increases when multidimensional auctions are used. Rather, good governance, particularly anti-corruption policies, can mitigate the renegotiation problem
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  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Procurement Efficiency For Infrastructure Development And Financial Needs Reassessed (2008)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (44 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Procurement Efficiency For Infrastructure Development And Financial Needs Reassessed
    Keywords: Costs ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Em ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Infrastructure investment ; Infrastructure projects ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Investments ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Road ; Roads ; Sanitation ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Em ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Infrastructure investment ; Infrastructure projects ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Investments ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Road ; Roads ; Sanitation ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Costs ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Em ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Economics ; Infrastructure Economics and Finance ; Infrastructure development ; Infrastructure investment ; Infrastructure projects ; Investment and Investment Climate ; Investments ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Road ; Roads ; Sanitation ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning
    Abstract: Infrastructure is the engine for economic growth. The international donor community has spent about 70-100 billion U.S. dollars on infrastructure development in developing countries every year. However, it is arguable whether these financial resources are used efficiently, particularly whether the current infrastructure procurement prices are appropriate. Without doubt a key is competition to curb public procurement costs. This paper analyzes procurement data from multi and bilateral official development projects in three infrastructure sectors: roads, electricity, and water and sanitation. The findings show that the competition effect is underutilized. To take full advantage of competition, at least seven bidders are needed in the road and water sectors, while three may be enough in the power sector. The paper also shows that not only competition, but also auction design, especially lot division, is crucial for reducing unit costs of infrastructure. Based on the estimated efficient unit costs, the annual financial needs are estimated at approximately 360 billion U.S. dollars. By promoting competition, the developing world might be able to save at most 8.2 percent of total infrastructure development costs
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  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Argentina's Transport Privatization and Re-Regulation : Ups and Downs of a Daring Decade-Long Experience (1999)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (30 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio Argentina's Transport Privatization and Re-Regulation
    Keywords: Airport ; Airport Authority ; Commuters ; Costs ; Infrastructure ; Investments ; Modal Shift ; Port Services ; Rail ; Railroad ; Railways ; Road Transport ; Roads ; Subsidy ; Subway ; Traffic ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Transport Sector ; Trucks ; Airport ; Airport Authority ; Commuters ; Costs ; Infrastructure ; Investments ; Modal Shift ; Port Services ; Rail ; Railroad ; Railways ; Road Transport ; Roads ; Subsidy ; Subway ; Traffic ; Transport ; Transport ; Transport Economics ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Transport Sector ; Trucks
    Abstract: November 1999 - Argentina's policy for reform of the transport sector has been a mix of competition in the market and, through concessions, for the market. Capacity has increased, demand has grown, and prices and services have improved. Public financing has not been eliminated but it has been drastically reduced. When Argentina initiated reform of its transport sector in 1989, it had few models to follow. It was the first Latin American country to privatize its intercity railroad, to explicitly organize intraport competition, and to grant a private concession to operate its subway. It was second (after Japan) to privatize its urban commuter railways and one of the first in the developing world to grant road concessions to private operators. Argentina's experience shows that transport privatization and deregulation provide efficiency gains that can be delivered to users. Despite unexpectedly high residual subsidy requirements, fiscal costs are lower, services have improved, and new investment is taking place. Argentina's decade-long experience shows that the reform process involves learning by doing. Inexperienced new regulators quickly face the challenges in controlling monopoly power and providing long-run incentives for private investment. Designing sustainable reform requires a commitment by government to minimize its role in the sector and to respect its original promises to both users and concessionaires. Argentina has learned the importance of building up the regulatory capacity needed to monitor contracts, especially when initial uncertainty about demand and cost conditions is strong and renegotiation is the probable outcome of daring reform. The government's main challenge in monitoring contracts is to get enough information to reach a balance in its decisions about distributing efficiency gains fairly between consumers and private investors. This is one area in which Argentina may not yet have met the challenge. As the last wave of contract extensions in rail and roads comes to an end, one issue is likely to be the need for better targeting of subsidies for the poor. This paper - a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute - is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation. Antonio Estache may be contacted at aestacheworldbank.org
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  • 10
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    The Rise, the Fall, and . . . the Emerging Recovery of Project Finance in Transport (1999)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (38 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Estache, Antonio The Rise, the Fall, and . . . the Emerging Recovery of Project Finance in Transport
    Keywords: Bank Debt ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Bond ; Capital Structures ; Debt Markets ; Debt Servicing ; Emerging Bond Markets ; Emerging Markets ; Emerging Markets ; Environment ; Environmental Economics and Policies ; Finance ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Crises ; Financial Intermediation ; Financial Literacy ; Financial Performance ; Good ; Infrastructure Finance ; Interest ; Interest Rate ; Interest Rate Risk ; Investing ; Market ; Pension ; Pension Assets ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Revenues ; Short-Term Debt ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning ; Bank Debt ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Bond ; Capital Structures ; Debt Markets ; Debt Servicing ; Emerging Bond Markets ; Emerging Markets ; Emerging Markets ; Environment ; Environmental Economics and Policies ; Finance ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Crises ; Financial Intermediation ; Financial Literacy ; Financial Performance ; Good ; Infrastructure Finance ; Interest ; Interest Rate ; Interest Rate Risk ; Investing ; Market ; Pension ; Pension Assets ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Revenues ; Short-Term Debt ; Transport ; Transport Economics, Policy and Planning
    Abstract: July 2000 - Many transport projects undertaken during the boom period of the 1990s came to a crashing halt in 1997, and conditions in emerging markets worsened in 1998 and 1999. Many projects failed, victim of everything from overoptimistic forecasts to excessive debt to an inability to refinance bridge loans. As available financing dried up, many projects went bankrupt, had to be renegotiated, or were taken over by the government. What have we learned from all this? Recent developments in emerging financial markets have dramatically changed the appetite for (and terms of) transport infrastructure projects. As a result of defaults in Asia and Russia and devaluations in Asia, Brazil, and Russia, political and currency and exchange risk premia have increased dramatically. Given large needs for sovereign debt financing, infrastructure project finance will be seeking guarantees at the same time as governments are issuing primary securities. Large portfolio outflows in emerging market funds mean that the sources of both equity and debt capital that became available in the mid-1990s are drying up for all but the most creditworthy projects. Moreover, real economic effects from financial events have consequences in the transport sector, since transport is a derived demand. Any decline in real economic activity is felt quickly in traffic levels and revenues. Currency devaluations that help spur exports may generate higher volumes for seaports and air cargo activity. These effects vary by sector, especially over the medium to longer term. Declines in real economic activity make matters especially difficult for toll roads, as drivers shift to free alternatives and reduce the number of trips taken. What does all this mean for project finance in transport? Risks have increased. Debt finance costs more. The available tenor of debt instruments has shortened and more equity is required for projects. The sources and availability of equity finance have changed. Project finance efforts have shifted from new projects to the privatization, rehabilitation, and expansion of existing facilities. And a superclass of sponsors, bankers, and investors has emerged. Failures and mistakes in project finance deals in the 1990s were sharp and persistent. But much has been learned about sound project economics, conservative financial structures, comprehensive sensitivity analysis, the effects of macroeconomic factors, and the need for proper incentives and sound institutional and regulatory arrangements. This paper-a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute-is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation. The authors may be contacted at aestacheworldbank.org or jstrong@worldbank.org
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