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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (46 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Honohan, Patrick Beyond Capital Ideals
    Keywords: Bank ; Bank Failures ; Bankers ; Banking ; Banking Crises ; Banking Stability ; Banks ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Capital ; Capital Adequacy ; Capital Flows ; Debt Markets ; Economies ; Emerging Markets ; Emerging Markets ; Externalities ; Finance ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Crises ; Financial Deepening ; Financial Literacy ; Financial Markets ; Financial Systems ; Inflation ; Infrastructure ; Private Sector Development ; Bank ; Bank Failures ; Bankers ; Banking ; Banking Crises ; Banking Stability ; Banks ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Capital ; Capital Adequacy ; Capital Flows ; Debt Markets ; Economies ; Emerging Markets ; Emerging Markets ; Externalities ; Finance ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Crises ; Financial Deepening ; Financial Literacy ; Financial Markets ; Financial Systems ; Inflation ; Infrastructure ; Private Sector Development
    Abstract: Hard on the heels of Mexico's crisis in 1994, a wave of financial crises swept across emerging economies - from East Asia and Russia to Brazil - bringing the fragility of banking and finance into unprecedented focus. What has gone wrong? - Caprio and Honohan examine why emerging markets, in particular, are susceptible to and affected by financial difficulties. They show that these difficulties have a richer, more complex structure than they are sometimes believed to have - with marked information asymmetries and substantial volatility. The sources of heightened regulatory failure in emerging markets in recent years include the volatility of real and nominal shocks, the difficulty of operating in uncharted territory after financial liberalization and other changes in regime, and the political pressures that can inhibit the enforcement of prudential regulation. Caprio and Honohan discuss what stronger regulation can and cannot accomplish, as well as options to improve the incentive structure for bankers, regulators, and other market participants. They probe the shortcomings of a regulatory paradigm that relies mainly on supervised capital adequacy and discuss the possible intermittent application of supplementary blunt instruments as an interim solution while longer-term reforms are being put in place. Certain well-worn messages remain valid, but are respected more in theory than in practice. There would be fewer problems, the authors say, if there were: · More diversification. · More balanced financial structures (for example, as between debt and equity). · More foreign banks in emerging markets' financial systems. · Better enforcement of both contracts and regulations. Participants in the financial sector will constantly try to get around rules that limit their profitability, so regulation must be seen as an evolutionary struggle. Prevention of financial failure is not costless, and a heavy repressive hand is not warranted. But a richer regulatory palette can be used to protect financial systems more successfully against crisis while preserving the systems' growth-enhancing effectiveness. This paper is a joint product of Finance, Development Research Group, and the Financial Sector Practice Department. The authors may be contacted at gcaprioworldbank.org or phonohan@worldbank.org
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (20 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Honohan, Patrick Perverse Effects of a Ratings-Related Capital Adequacy System
    Keywords: Bank ; Bank Failure ; Bank Failures ; Banking Supervision ; Banks ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Capital ; Capital Adequacy ; Capital Requirement ; Capital Requirements ; Debt ; Debt Markets ; Deposit Insurance ; Deposits ; Emerging Markets ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Interest ; Lending ; Loans ; Private Sector Development ; Projects ; Rating Agencies ; Risk ; Risk Factors ; Systemic Risk ; Bank ; Bank Failure ; Bank Failures ; Banking Supervision ; Banks ; Banks and Banking Reform ; Capital ; Capital Adequacy ; Capital Requirement ; Capital Requirements ; Debt ; Debt Markets ; Deposit Insurance ; Deposits ; Emerging Markets ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Interest ; Lending ; Loans ; Private Sector Development ; Projects ; Rating Agencies ; Risk ; Risk Factors ; Systemic Risk
    Abstract: June 2000 - Allowing banks to hold less capital against loans to borrowers who have received a favorable rating by an approved rating agency may result in a rating system that neither reveals risk information about borrowers nor protects the deposit insurance fund. Part of the problem is the very idea of basing portfolio risk evaluation on the sum of individual loan risks, but there are also important incentive issues. It has recently been proposed that banks be allowed to hold less capital against loans to borrowers who have received a favorable rating by an approved rating agency. But a plausible model of rating-agency behavior shows that this strategy could have perverse results, actually increasing the risk of deposit insurance outlays. First, there is an issue of signaling, with low-ability borrowers possibly altering their behavior to secure a lower capital requirement for their borrowing. Second, establishing a regulatory cut-off may actually reduce the amount of risk information made available by raters. Besides, the credibility of rating agencies may not be damaged by neglect of the risk of unusual systemic shocks, although deposit insurers greatest outlays come chiefly at times of systemic crisis. And using agencies' individual ratings is unlikely to be an effective early-warning system for the risk of systemic failure, so use of the ratings could lull policymakers into a false sense of security. It is important to harness market information to improve bank safety (for example, by increasing the role of large, well-informed, but uninsured claimants), but this particular approach could be counterproductive. Relying on ratings could induce borrowers to increase their exposure to systemic risk even if they reduce exposure to specific risk. This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to examine the effects of financial sector regulation. The author may be contacted at phonohanworldbank.org
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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