Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
  • 1
    ISBN: 9781464806612
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (pages cm))
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    Series Statement: Latin American Development Forum
    Series Statement: World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Druckausg.
    DDC: 339.46098
    Keywords: Poverty Caribbean Area ; Poverty Latin America ; Poverty ; Poverty ; Caribbean Area Economic conditions ; 21st century ; Caribbean Area Economic policy ; 21st century ; Latin America Economic conditions ; 21st century ; Latin America Economic policy ; 21st century ; Latin America Economic conditions 21st century ; Latin America Economic policy 21st century ; Caribbean Area Economic conditions 21st century ; Caribbean Area Economic policy 21st century
    Abstract: Foreword -- Acknowledgements -- The roaring 2000's in Latin America and the Caribbean and the left behind -- Chronic poverty : concepts and measures -- Five facts about chronic poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean -- Drivers of chronic poverty -- From diagnosis to policies : design elements to support the chronic poor -- References -- Appendix
    Note: Includes bibliographical references. - Description based on print version record
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (37 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Loayza, Norman V Informality Trends And Cycles
    Keywords: Active Labor ; Business Cycle ; Economic Theory and Research ; Exogenous Variable ; Informal Economies ; Informal Economy ; Informal Employment ; Informal Labor Markets ; Informal Sector ; Labor ; Labor ; Labor Force ; Labor Markets ; Labor Policies ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Social Protections and Labor ; Active Labor ; Business Cycle ; Economic Theory and Research ; Exogenous Variable ; Informal Economies ; Informal Economy ; Informal Employment ; Informal Labor Markets ; Informal Sector ; Labor ; Labor ; Labor Force ; Labor Markets ; Labor Policies ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Social Protections and Labor ; Active Labor ; Business Cycle ; Economic Theory and Research ; Exogenous Variable ; Informal Economies ; Informal Economy ; Informal Employment ; Informal Labor Markets ; Informal Sector ; Labor ; Labor ; Labor Force ; Labor Markets ; Labor Policies ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Social Protections and Labor
    Abstract: This paper studies the trends and cycles of informal employment. It first presents a theoretical model where the size of informal employment is determined by the relative costs and benefits of informality and the distribution of workers' skills. In the long run, informal employment varies with the trends in these variables, and in the short run it reacts to accommodate transient shocks and to close the gap that separates it from its trend level. The paper then uses an error-correction framework to examine empirically informality's long- and short-run relationships. For this purpose, it uses country-level data at annual frequency for a sample of industrial and developing countries, with the share of self-employment in the labor force as the proxy for informal employment. The paper finds that, in the long run, informality is larger in countries that have lower GDP per capita and impose more costs to formal firms in the form of more rigid business regulations, less valuable police and judicial services, and weaker monitoring of informality. In the short run, informal employment is found to be counter-cyclical for the majority of countries, with the degree of counter-cyclicality being lower in countries with larger informal employment and better police and judicial services. Moreover, informal employment follows a stable, trend-reverting process. These results are robust to changes in the sample and to the influence of outliers, even when only developing countries are considered in the analysis
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (21 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Dhillon, Amrita Development And The Interaction of Enforcement Institutions
    Keywords: Adverse Selection ; Asymmetric Information ; Competitiveness and Competition Policies ; Consumers ; Cred Economic Performance ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Equilibrium ; Expected Utility ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Fixed Costs ; Incentives ; Influence ; Insurance and Risk Mitigation ; Investment ; Labor Policies ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Marginal Costs ; Microfinance ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Development ; Social Protections and Labor ; Adverse Selection ; Asymmetric Information ; Competitiveness and Competition Policies ; Consumers ; Cred Economic Performance ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Equilibrium ; Expected Utility ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Fixed Costs ; Incentives ; Influence ; Insurance and Risk Mitigation ; Investment ; Labor Policies ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Marginal Costs ; Microfinance ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Development ; Social Protections and Labor ; Adverse Selection ; Asymmetric Information ; Competitiveness and Competition Policies ; Consumers ; Cred Economic Performance ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Equilibrium ; Expected Utility ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Fixed Costs ; Incentives ; Influence ; Insurance and Risk Mitigation ; Investment ; Labor Policies ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Marginal Costs ; Microfinance ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Development ; Social Protections and Labor
    Abstract: The authors examine how institutions that enforce contracts between two parties-producers and consumers-interact in a competitive market with one-sided asymmetric information and productivity shocks. They compare an informal enforcement mechanism, reputation, the efficacy of which is enhanced by consumers investing in "connectedness," with a formal mechanism, legal enforcement, the effectiveness of which can be reduced by producers by means of bribes. When legal enforcement is poor, consumers connect more with one another to improve informal enforcement. In contrast, a well-connected network of consumers reduces producers' incentives to bribe. In equilibrium, the model predicts a positive relationship between the frequency of productivity shocks, bribing, and the use of informal enforcement, providing a physical explanation of why developing countries often fail to have efficient legal systems. Firm-level estimations confirm the partial equilibrium implications of the model
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. More information can be found here...