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  • 1
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (27 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Breceda, Karla Latin America And The Social Contract
    Keywords: Economic Theory and Research ; Economic performance ; Emerging Markets ; Housing ; Housing subsidies ; Income taxes ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Poverty Reduction ; Private Sector Development ; Public ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Public resources ; Public spending ; Services and Transfers to Poor ; Tax ; Tax revenues ; Taxation ; Taxation and Subsidies ; Economic Theory and Research ; Economic performance ; Emerging Markets ; Housing ; Housing subsidies ; Income taxes ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Poverty Reduction ; Private Sector Development ; Public ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Public resources ; Public spending ; Services and Transfers to Poor ; Tax ; Tax revenues ; Taxation ; Taxation and Subsidies ; Economic Theory and Research ; Economic performance ; Emerging Markets ; Housing ; Housing subsidies ; Income taxes ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Poverty Reduction ; Private Sector Development ; Public ; Public Sector Economics and Finance ; Public resources ; Public spending ; Services and Transfers to Poor ; Tax ; Tax revenues ; Taxation ; Taxation and Subsidies
    Abstract: This paper presents an incidence analysis of both social spending and taxation for seven Latin American countries, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The analysis shows that Latin American countries are headed de facto toward a minimalist welfare state similar to the one in the United States, rather than toward a stronger, European-like welfare state. Specifically, both in Latin America and in the United States, social spending remains fairly flat across income quintiles. On the taxation side, high income inequality causes the rich to bear most of the taxation burden. This causes a vicious cycle where the rich oppose the expansion of the welfare state (as they bear most of its burden without receiving much back), which in turn maintains long-term inequalities. The recent increased socioeconomic instability in many Latin American countries shows nonetheless a real need for a stronger welfare state, which, if unanswered, may degenerate into short-term and unsustainable policies. The case of Chile suggests that a way out from this apparent dead end can be found, as elites may be willing to raise their contribution to social spending if this can lead to a more stable social contract
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 2
    ISBN: 9781464806612
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (pages cm))
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    Series Statement: Latin American Development Forum
    Series Statement: World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Druckausg.
    DDC: 339.46098
    Keywords: Poverty Caribbean Area ; Poverty Latin America ; Poverty ; Poverty ; Caribbean Area Economic conditions ; 21st century ; Caribbean Area Economic policy ; 21st century ; Latin America Economic conditions ; 21st century ; Latin America Economic policy ; 21st century ; Latin America Economic conditions 21st century ; Latin America Economic policy 21st century ; Caribbean Area Economic conditions 21st century ; Caribbean Area Economic policy 21st century
    Abstract: Foreword -- Acknowledgements -- The roaring 2000's in Latin America and the Caribbean and the left behind -- Chronic poverty : concepts and measures -- Five facts about chronic poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean -- Drivers of chronic poverty -- From diagnosis to policies : design elements to support the chronic poor -- References -- Appendix
    Note: Includes bibliographical references. - Description based on print version record
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (21 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Dhillon, Amrita Development And The Interaction of Enforcement Institutions
    Keywords: Adverse Selection ; Asymmetric Information ; Competitiveness and Competition Policies ; Consumers ; Cred Economic Performance ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Equilibrium ; Expected Utility ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Fixed Costs ; Incentives ; Influence ; Insurance and Risk Mitigation ; Investment ; Labor Policies ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Marginal Costs ; Microfinance ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Development ; Social Protections and Labor ; Adverse Selection ; Asymmetric Information ; Competitiveness and Competition Policies ; Consumers ; Cred Economic Performance ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Equilibrium ; Expected Utility ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Fixed Costs ; Incentives ; Influence ; Insurance and Risk Mitigation ; Investment ; Labor Policies ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Marginal Costs ; Microfinance ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Development ; Social Protections and Labor ; Adverse Selection ; Asymmetric Information ; Competitiveness and Competition Policies ; Consumers ; Cred Economic Performance ; Debt Markets ; E-Business ; Economic Theory and Research ; Emerging Markets ; Equilibrium ; Expected Utility ; Finance and Financial Sector Development ; Financial Literacy ; Fixed Costs ; Incentives ; Influence ; Insurance and Risk Mitigation ; Investment ; Labor Policies ; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth ; Marginal Costs ; Microfinance ; Private Sector Development ; Public Sector Development ; Social Protections and Labor
    Abstract: The authors examine how institutions that enforce contracts between two parties-producers and consumers-interact in a competitive market with one-sided asymmetric information and productivity shocks. They compare an informal enforcement mechanism, reputation, the efficacy of which is enhanced by consumers investing in "connectedness," with a formal mechanism, legal enforcement, the effectiveness of which can be reduced by producers by means of bribes. When legal enforcement is poor, consumers connect more with one another to improve informal enforcement. In contrast, a well-connected network of consumers reduces producers' incentives to bribe. In equilibrium, the model predicts a positive relationship between the frequency of productivity shocks, bribing, and the use of informal enforcement, providing a physical explanation of why developing countries often fail to have efficient legal systems. Firm-level estimations confirm the partial equilibrium implications of the model
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