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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cheltenham, U.K : Edward Elgar
    ISBN: 9781845421441
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (viii, 254 p) , ill
    Series Statement: The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) series on economics and the environment
    Series Statement: Edward Elgar E-Book Archive
    Parallel Title: Available in another form
    Parallel Title: Elektronische Reproduktion von Game practice and the environment
    DDC: 363.7/001/5193
    RVK:
    Keywords: Umweltpolitik ; Internationale Umweltpolitik ; Umweltökonomik ; Umweltkosten ; Ressourcenökonomik ; Finanzmathematik ; Spieltheorie ; Theorie ; Environmental policy Economic aspects ; Mathematical models ; Natural resources Management ; Mathematical models ; Pollution Economic aspects ; Mathematical models ; Environmental protection Finance ; Mathematical models ; Climatic changes International cooperation ; Mathematical models ; Game theory ; Electronic books ; Umweltökonomie ; Spieltheorie
    Abstract: This book summarises the latest achievements of researchers involved in the application of game theory to the analysis of environmental matters. It provides an overview of different methods and applications, and gives the reader new insights on the solutions to complex environmental problems. The authors investigate various game theoretic approaches, including cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, and analyse both dynamic and static games. They illustrate the application of these approaches to global and local environmental problems, and present novel but effective tools to support environmental policy making. In particular, they focus on three important issues; climate negotiations and policy, the sharing of environmental costs, and environmental management and pollution control
    Abstract: pt. 1. Climate negotiations and policy -- pt. 2. Sharing environmental costs -- pt. 3. Environmental management and pollution control
    Note: Includes bibliographical references and index
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 2
    Language: English
    Pages: 74 p. , 21 x 29.7cm
    Series Statement: OECD Economics Department Working Papers no.702
    Keywords: Economics
    Abstract: This paper uses WITCH, an integrated assessment model with a game-theoretic structure, to explore the prospects for, and the stability of broad coalitions to achieve ambitious climate change mitigation action. Only coalitions including all large emitting regions are found to be technically able to meet a concentration stabilisation target below 550 ppm CO2eq by 2100. Once the free-riding incentives of non-participants are taken into account, only a “grand coalition” including virtually all regions can be successful. This grand coalition is profitable as a whole, implying that all countries can gain from participation provided appropriate transfers are made across them. However, neither the grand coalition nor smaller but still environmentally significant coalitions appear to be stable. This is because the collective welfare surplus from cooperation is not found to be large enough for transfers to offset the free-riding incentives of all countries simultaneously. Some factors omitted from the analysis, which might improve coalition stability, include the co-benefits from mitigation action, the costless removal of fossil fuel subsidies, as well as alternative assumptions regarding countries’ bargaining behaviour.
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