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  • 1
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (29 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Deininger, Klaus Do Overlapping Property Rights Reduce Agricultural Investment ?
    Keywords: Agriculture ; Classification ; Common Property Resource Development ; Communities & Human Settlements ; Conservation ; Economic growth ; Fruits ; Labor Policies ; Land management ; Land ownership ; Land use ; Municipal Housing and Land ; Plots ; Real Estate Development ; Rural Development ; Social Protections and Labor ; Water Resources ; Wetlands ; Wetlands ; Agriculture ; Classification ; Common Property Resource Development ; Communities & Human Settlements ; Conservation ; Economic growth ; Fruits ; Labor Policies ; Land management ; Land ownership ; Land use ; Municipal Housing and Land ; Plots ; Real Estate Development ; Rural Development ; Social Protections and Labor ; Water Resources ; Wetlands ; Wetlands ; Agriculture ; Classification ; Common Property Resource Development ; Communities & Human Settlements ; Conservation ; Economic growth ; Fruits ; Labor Policies ; Land management ; Land ownership ; Land use ; Municipal Housing and Land ; Plots ; Real Estate Development ; Rural Development ; Social Protections and Labor ; Water Resources ; Wetlands ; Wetlands
    Abstract: The need for land-related investment to ensure sustainable land management and increase productivity of land use is widely recognized. However, there is little rigorous evidence on the effects of property rights for increasing agricultural productivity and contributing toward poverty reduction in Africa. Whether and by how much overlapping property rights reduce investment incentives, and the scope for policies to counter such disincentives, are thus important policy issues. Using information on parcels under ownership and usufruct by the same household from a nationally representative survey in Uganda, the authors find significant disincentives associated with overlapping property rights on short and long-term investments. The paper combines this result with information on crop productivity to obtain a rough estimate of the magnitudes involved. The authors make suggestions on ways to eliminate such inefficiencies
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 2
    Language: English
    Pages: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (32 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Parallel Title: Deininger, Klaus Assessing The Functioning of Land Rental Markets In Ethiopia
    Keywords: Communities & Human Settlements ; Cultivation ; Economic Development ; Labor Policies ; Land Leasing ; Land Markets ; Land Owners ; Land Ownership ; Land Rental ; Land Resources ; Land Use ; Land Use and Policies ; Municipal Housing and Land ; Poverty Reduction ; Rural Development ; Rural Development Knowledge and Information Systems ; Rural Land Policies for Poverty Reduction ; Sharecropping ; Social Protections and Labor ; Communities & Human Settlements ; Cultivation ; Economic Development ; Labor Policies ; Land Leasing ; Land Markets ; Land Owners ; Land Ownership ; Land Rental ; Land Resources ; Land Use ; Land Use and Policies ; Municipal Housing and Land ; Poverty Reduction ; Rural Development ; Rural Development Knowledge and Information Systems ; Rural Land Policies for Poverty Reduction ; Sharecropping ; Social Protections and Labor ; Communities & Human Settlements ; Cultivation ; Economic Development ; Labor Policies ; Land Leasing ; Land Markets ; Land Owners ; Land Ownership ; Land Rental ; Land Resources ; Land Use ; Land Use and Policies ; Municipal Housing and Land ; Poverty Reduction ; Rural Development ; Rural Development Knowledge and Information Systems ; Rural Land Policies for Poverty Reduction ; Sharecropping ; Social Protections and Labor
    Abstract: Although a large theoretical literature discusses the possible inefficiency of sharecropping contracts, the empirical evidence on this phenomenon has been ambiguous at best. Household-level fixed-effect estimates from about 8,500 plots operated by households that own and sharecrop land in the Ethiopian highlands provide support for the hypothesis of Marshallian inefficiency. At the same time, a factor adjustment model suggests that the extent to which rental markets allow households to attain their desired operational holding size is extremely limited. Our analysis points towards factor market imperfections (no rental for oxen), lack of alternative employment opportunities, and tenure insecurity as possible reasons underlying such behavior, suggesting that, rather than worrying almost exclusively about Marshallian inefficiency, it is equally warranted to give due attention to the policy framework within which land rental markets operate
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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