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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cham : Springer International Publishing | Cham : Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan
    ISBN: 9783031375743
    Language: English
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (XXV, 455 p. 303 illus., 100 illus. in color.)
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Parallel Title: Erscheint auch als
    Keywords: Experimental economics. ; Game theory. ; Economics ; Game theory ; Sequential-move games of incomplete information ; Signaling games with discrete actions ; Signaling games with continuous actions ; Equilibrium refinements ; Cheap-talk games
    Abstract: Chapter 1. Introduction to games and their representation.-Chapter 2. Equilibrium dominance.-Chapter 3. Nash equilibrium.-Chapter 4. Nash equilibria in games with continuous action spaces.-Chapter 5. Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium -- Chapter 6. Subgame perfect equilibrium -- Chapter 7. Repeated games -- Chapter 8. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium -- Chapter 9. Auction theory -- Chapter 10. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium -- Chapter 11. Equilibrium Refinements -- Chapter 12. Signaling games with continuous messages -- Chapter 13. Cheap talk games.
    Abstract: An introduction to game theory, complete with step-by-step tools and detailed examples. This book offers condensed breakdowns of game-theory concepts. Specifically, this textbook provides “tools” or “recipes” to solve different classes of games. Game Theory does not require readers to have a strong mathematical background, as the book presents the information as plainly as possible. Every chapter begins with the main definitions and concepts before diving into the applications to different settings across economics, business, and other social sciences. Chapters walk readers through algebraic steps and simplifications. This makes the text accessible for undergraduate and Masters-level students in economics and finance. Paired with the exercises published on the accompanying website, students will improve both their theoretical and practical understandings of game theory. Readers will walk away from this book understanding complete and incomplete information models as well as signaling games. Ana Espinola-Arredondo is Associate Director and Professor in the School of Economic Sciences at Washington State University, USA. Espinola-Arredondo has published numerous articles and she and Felix Muñoz-Garcia have co-authored three other books together: Common Pool Resources: Strategic Behavior, Inefficiencies, and Incomplete Information (2021), Intermediate Economic Theory: Tools and Step-by-Step Examples (2020), and Practice Exercises for Intermediate Economic Theory (2020, also with Eric Dunaway and John C. Strandholm). Felix Muñoz-Garcia is Professor in the School of Economic Sciences at Washington State University, USA. Muñoz-Garcia has published many journal articles and he and Espinola-Arredondo have co-authored three other books, along with other textbooks such as Advanced Microeconomic Theory: An Intuitive Approach with Examples (2017), and Industrial Organization: Practice Exercises with Answer Keys (2021, with Pak-Sing Choi and Eric Dunaway).
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